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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The North Dakota Supreme Court Review briefly summarizes
important decisions rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court. The
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISIONS-REVIEW OF PARTICULAR QUESTIONS
HUFF V. NORTH DAKOTA STATE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS-
INVESTIGATIVE PANEL B
The North Dakota State Board of Medical Examiners-Investigative
Panel B (Board) issued a complaint against John D. Huff, M.D., in response
to the administration of an Ishihara test (I-test) to a patient, Shawn
Anderson, first by a nurse and then by Huff.' An I-test is a method for
evaluating "color vision deficiency that utilizes a series of pseudioso-
chromatic plates on which numbers or letters are printed in dots of primary
colors surrounded by dots of other colors; the figures are discernible by
individuals with normal color vision." 2 The Board complaint alleged that
Huff "engaged in the performance of dishonorable, unethical, or unpro-
fessional conduct likely to deceive, defraud or harm the public within the
meaning of N.D.C.C. § 43-17-31(6), and/or Respondent engaged in gross
negligence in the practice of medicine within the meaning of N.D.C.C. §
43-17-31(15) .... "3 The complaint asserted that after Anderson failed the
first I-test, Huff re-administered the test and manually aided Anderson by
guiding Anderson's hand in tracing the symbols or numbers on the plates.4
Huff admitted that he aided Anderson in the tracing of the symbol on the
first plate, but argued that appropriate protocol permitted the person giving
the exam to instruct the patient on using his or her finger to trace the pattern
on the plate as an aid in determining what symbol appeared on the plate.5
At his hearing, Huff agreed that if the evidence showed that he had aided
Anderson in determining the symbol present on every plate presented in the
test, such conduct would have been "inappropriate, unprofessional, and
gross negligence." 6 The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), based on
1. Huff v. N.D. State Bd. of Med. Examiners-Investigative Panel B, 2004 ND 225, 5 2, 690
N.W.2d 221, 222.
2. Id. (citing PDR MEDICAL DICTIONARY at 1804 (2d ed. 2000)).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. T 3, 690 N.W.2d at 223.
6. Id. at 224.
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testimony presented by Anderson and a certified opthamolic assistant who
witnessed Huff's examination of Anderson, concluded that Huff violated
the provisions of North Dakota Century Code section 43-17-31 when he
administered his exam of Anderson. 7 The ALJ cited Huff's conduct in
crossing out the results of Anderson's original exam conducted by the
nurse, and his inflated evaluation of the capability with which Anderson
identified the symbols on the different plates as inappropriate, dishonorable,
unprofessional, unethical, and likely to defraud, deceive, or harm the
public. 8 The ALT's recommendation that Huff's license be suspended was
adopted by the Board, and Huff's license was suspended for one year.9 The
district court subsequently affirmed the Board's order and Huff appealed. 10
The issue before the court was "whether or not expert testimony was
necessary about the required standard of care and whether or not Huff
deviated from that standard."l The court clarified that when a case is on
appeal from an administrative agency decision, it will not substitute its
judgment for the judgment of the agency, nor will it make independent
findings.12 Additionally, the court explained that an agency's decisions
regarding questions of law are fully reviewable. 13 Huff's argument asserted
that when the license of a professional is at stake, the testimony of an expert
regarding the applicable standard of professional conduct is required when
considering the issue of whether that standard of conduct was met. 14 The
court first explained that differences existed between physician disciplinary
proceedings and medical malpractice actions. 5 In contrast, an attorney
disciplinary proceeding primarily deals with minimum levels of conduct
and most often, "the rules themselves" establish "the standard of conduct,"
whereas an action for malpractice focuses on the reasonableness of an
attorney's conduct under certain circumstances.' 6 However, the court
distinguished, under North Dakota Century Code section 43-17-31,





12. Id. 8, 690 N.W.2d at 226 (citing Aamodt v. N.D. Dep't of Transp., 2004 ND 134, 12,
682 N.W.2d 308, 312-13).
13. Id. (citing Linser v. Office of Att'y. Gen., 2003 ND 195 6, 672 N.W.2d 643, 645-46).
14. Id. 9.
15. Id.
16. Id. (citing In re Disciplinary Action Against McKechnie, 2003 ND 22, 16, 656 N.W.2d
661,666).
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"physician disciplinary proceedings can be based on both types of
conduct."17
In beginning its analysis, the court asserted that a majority of
jurisdictions that had addressed this issue held that expert testimony was
required when the license of a physician was at stake, because it protected
the fairness of the proceedings, the administrative record's integrity, and the
party's right to a "meaningful judicial review of administrative decisions."18
The court cited four reasons for the requirement of expert testimony in these
types of cases: (1) individuals with their licenses at stake in such a
proceeding have "the right to confront, cross-examine, and rebut the
evidence against them"; (2) the fact finding of an administrative agency
must be constrained to the "evidence properly included in the admini-
strative record"; and (3) many administrative boards and agencies are no
longer comprised solely of persons with expertise in the field being
regulated, and expert testimony is, therefore, necessary to aid those board
members who lack such expertise to conduct their adjudicatory respon-
sibilities; and, (4) allowing for the substitution of board members' expert
opinions in lieu of "necessary expert testimony" inhibits the "ability of a
reviewing court to determine whether the decision of an agency was based
upon substantial and material evidence." 9
The Board cited three instances in which other courts articulated
against necessitating expert testimony. 20 The first instance cited by the
Board was a holding that experts were only necessitated if the legislature
required them. 21 The second instance cited by the Board was a holding that
expert testimony was not required if a "majority of the Board and its
investigative members were licensed [dentists] familiar with the standard of
care required." 22 The third instance cited by the Board was a holding that
expert testimony was only required if the Board was not composed of a
majority of experts. 23 Finally, the Board also maintained that expert
testimony, even if ordinarily required, was not needed in this case because
"the conduct was so egregious[,] expert testimony was unnecessary ...."24
Taking these factors into consideration, the court relied upon decisions
17. Id.
18. Id. 5 10, 690 N.W.2d at 227 (citing Martin v. Sizemore, 78 S.W.3d 249, 271 n.12 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2001)).
19. Id. (quoting Martin, 78 S.W.3d at 271).
20. Id. 11.
21. Id. (citing Ferguson v. Hamrick, 388 So. 2d 981, 983 (Ala. 1980)).
22. Id. (citing Croft v. Ariz. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs., 755 P.2d 1191, 1198 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1988)).
23. Id. (citing Jutkowitz v. Dep't of Health Servs., 596 A.2d 374, 387-88 (Conn. 1991)).
24. Id.
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reached by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine and the Tennessee Court
of Appeals holding that where an act is improper or blatantly illegal, or
where a licensee has admitted to a violation, a disciplinary board is not
required to provide expert evidence in order to establish the necessary
standard. 25 However, in certain instances an administrative review board
may be comprised of some members who are not medical professionals,
and some who may be medical professionals but are not necessarily experts
in the field of medicine practiced by the physician before the board. 26 In
such instances, the court stated that requiring expert testimony would be the
best means of protecting "the fairness of the contested case proceedings, the
integrity of the administrative record, and the right to meaningful judicial
review. 27 In the case at bar, Huff asserted that had he given the test to
Anderson in the manner described by Anderson and the observing assistant,
such actions would indeed have been in violation of the applicable
standards established in the N.D.C.C.28 The court affirmed the license
suspension by the Board.29 The court reasoned that since the Board deter-
mined that the evidence presented by Anderson and the technician who
observed Huff's administration of the test was the most credible, Huff's
actions were indeed in violation of the applicable standards established in
the N.D.C.C.30
Chief Justice VandeWalle concurred with the result of the majority
"[tio the extent [the] case turn[ed] on the credibility of witnesses before the
Board." 31 In concurring specially with the opinion, Chief Justice
VandeWalle took issue with the "scant evidence of professional misconduct
the attorney for the Board was able to wring from Huff's own lips." 32 The
Chief Justice admitted that although there was no error committed on behalf
of the ALJ or the Board in relying upon the testimony of Huff, "there is
surely a certain irony in so doing, particularly when his [own] credibility on
other matters [wa]s rejected by the ALJ and by the Board." 33
25. Id. 5 12, 690 N.W.2d at 228.
26. Id.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW- SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS - ELIGIBILITY
SUTHERLAND V. NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
In Sutherland v. North Dakota Department of Human Services, 34
Marian Sutherland appealed the district court judgment "affirming a
Department of Human Services decision that she was not disabled for
purpose[s] of receiving Medicaid benefits."35 The North Dakota Supreme
Court reversed the district court decision and determined that evaluating
eligibility for Medicaid disability payments must be evaluated using the
five-step process as determined by the Social Security Administration. 36
In June of 2002, Marian Sutherland applied to McKenzie County
Social Services for Medicaid benefits, claiming she was disabled. 37
Sutherland described her condition as including degenerative arthritis,
degenerative joint disease, destruction of knee joints, osteoarthritis in her
right knee, degenerative disc disease, lumbosacral arthritis, peripheral
neuropathy, bilateral food deformities, macrocytic anemia, and spondy-
loarthropathy. 38 Her eligibility report indicated that she had problems
walking and sitting for long periods of time, that she had to use crutches
because of her deformed feet and back, and that she suffered from constant
pain. 39 The State Review Team concluded that Sutherland's medical con-
dition was not sufficient to establish benefits, and therefore the McKenzie
County Social Services denied her application for Medicaid benefits for
failure to meet the "Social Security disability criteria." 40 Sutherland then
appealed to the Department of Human Services.4 1 "An administrative law
judge recommended that Sutherland be found disabled for purposes of'
benefits eligibility.4 2 However the Department found that it was not bound
to follow the same procedures as the Social Security Administration in
determining eligibility for Medicaid under C.F.R. § 435.541. 43
34. 2004 ND 212, 689 N.W.2d 880.
35. Sutherland, 1,689 N.W.2d at 880.
36. Id.
37. Id. T 2, 689 N.W.2d at 881. This application came after the Social Security Admini-







43. Id. 55 4-5. According to the Department, Sutherland failed to show that she had met the
Social Security Administration's definition of disability because she had "failed to prove that she
ha[d] a severe impairment, which makes her unable to do her previous work, or any other
[VOL. 81:585
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In a case such as this, the court is entitled to review the decision of the
administrative agency.44 An agency's decision will be affirmed if a rea-
sonable mind could have arrived at that decision based on the weight of the
evidence of the entire record.4 5 Sutherland argued that North Dakota law
bound the Department to follow the Social Security Administration's
standards.4 6 She further asserted that she would have qualified if such
Social Security Administration standards were followed.
47
The Social Security Administration, via its implementing act, defines
disability as the "'inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months."' 48 The first step in
the five-step Social Security Administration disability evaluation standard
determines whether the claimant "is engaged in 'substantial gainful
activity.' 49 If the individual is not engaged in "substantial gainful activity,"
the next step is to determine whether the claimant suffers from a "severe
impairment or a combination of impairments." 50 If the impairment is con-
sidered severe, the next step is to determine if the impairment is equal to
one of the listed impairments that the Secretary acknowledges as so severe
that it precludes "substantial gainful activity." 51 If the impairment is
considered equivalent, the claimant is deemed to be disabled.52 If not, the
fourth step requires a determination of whether the claimant can perform
the type of work he or she has done in the past.53 If the impairment is not
considered equivalent, the last step is to consider whether the claimant is
able to perform other work in consideration of his or her age, education, and
work experience.54
The Department failed to cite any authority supporting its claim that it
need not follow the five-step process, and since North Dakota law incor-
porates the federal definition of disability, the court held that the
substantial gainful activity which exists in the national economy." Id. 5 5. The Department in-
stead found that the evidence was sufficient to show that Sutherland was "capable of light





48. Id. 9,689 N.W.2d at 883 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(l)(A) (2000)).
49. Id. 10,689 N.W.2d at 883 (citing Bowen v. Yuchert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987)).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 883-84.
53. Id. at 884.
54. Id.
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Department was bound to follow the five-step process for determining
disability.55
The Department further argued that despite its failure to follow the pro-
cedure, its decision was consistent with the procedure. 56 The court high-
lighted that the severity requirement involved only minimal effects on the
claimant's work activities; therefore, the court found that the Department's
failure to follow the five-step procedure affected not only its evaluation, but
also the court's evaluation on appeal.57 Thus, the court remanded the case to
the Department with the instructions that the claim be reviewed under the
five-step procedure as provided by the Social Security Administration. 58
CIVIL PROCEDURE- CHOICE OF LAW - AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
NODAK MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. v. WAMSLEY
In Nodak Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wamsley,59 the defendants appealed
a declaratory judgment entered by the district court in favor of the plaintiff,
Nodak Mutual Insurance Company (Nodak), to determine the obligations of
Nodak under an insurance policy. 60 The insurance dispute arose out of a
fatal collision involving the parents (Wamsleys) of the defendants, who
were killed when another vehicle struck their car in Montana.6' As a result
of the three vehicle insurance policies that provided uninsured motorist
coverage (UIM) of $100,000 per person, per accident, Nodak paid $200,000
to the Wamsley estate. 62
Nodak brought a declaratory action in North Dakota against the
Wamsley heirs, and alleged that the UIM did not apply to the accident and
could not be stacked. 63 The Wamsley heirs filed a motion to dismiss
Nodak's claim due to "forum non conveniens and for failure to state a claim
55. Id. 5J 11, 689 N.W.2d at 884. 42 C.F.R. § 435.541(d)(2) provides that the Department
must "make a determination of disability ... [iun accordance with the requirements for evaluating





59. 2004 ND 174, 687 N.W.2d 226.
60. Wamsley, 5 1, 687 N.W.2d at 228.
61. Id. 5 2. The parents of the defendants were Alan and Sharon Wamsley. Id. The insurer
of the other car's driver paid the Wamsley estate the policy limit of $25,000 per person. Id.; see
id., 1 (explaining that the defendants included Corey Wamsley, Jeff Wamsley, Joe Wamsley,
Craig Wamsley, Kimberly Kinev, and Jamie Pfau (hereinafter "Wamsley Heirs")).
62. Id. T 3.
63. Id. 5 4.
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upon which relief may be granted." 64 The Wamsley heirs pleaded that the
Montana Supreme Court allowed stacking, and argued that Montana law
should apply.65 In response, Nodak argued that North Dakota law should
apply, where policies and provisions prohibit stacking.66 The trial court
denied the Wamsley heirs' request for dismissal, and stated that North
Dakota had more significant contacts and an interest in the issue. 67 The
trial court granted Nodak's summary judgment motion, as the court had
already determined that North Dakota law applied. 68 Judgment was entered
and the Wamsley heirs conceded that Nodak was not obligated to stack
UIM coverages, and that the maximum amount of UIM coverage had
already been paid by Nodak under the policy. 69 On appeal, the Wamsley
heirs again contended that Montana law should apply to the litigation. 70
The North Dakota Supreme Court first analyzed whether the appeal
was premature under North Dakota Century Code section 32-23-06.71 This
section states that in actions brought by an insurance company to determine
liability to the insured, the court shall enter a declaratory judgment, even
though liability has not been determined. 72 The section further provides
that the court has the discretion to grant or deny a request for declaratory
judgment, and its decision will not be overturned unless there has been an
abuse of discretion. 73 However, the Wamsley court stated that this statute
was inapplicable because Nodak was not trying to determine its respon-
sibility to defend or questioning coverage. 74 The court concluded the trial
court did not abuse its discretion. 75
The court then examined the choice-of-law issue-whether North
Dakota law or Montana law governed coverage under the insurance
policies. 76 The court stated the determination of which state law to apply
would be based on the disputed issue; in this case, the court determined that
the disputed issue was the availability of stacking and that it was a contract
64. Id. 5.
65. Id. at 228-29.







73. Id. (citing Blackburn, Nickels & Smith, Inc. v. Nat'l Farmers Union Prop. & Cass. Co.,
452 N.W.2d 319, 322 (N.D. 1990)).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. T 9, 687 N.W.2d at 230.
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issue.77 Under contract choice-of-law, the court applied the significant
contacts test using a two-prong analysis. 78 The two-prong test required the
court to identify the applicable contacts in each respective state and then to
apply Leflar's choice-influencing considerations to determine which juris-
diction had the most significant interest in the issue.79
The first part of the court's Leflar analysis explained predictability of
results. 80 The court noted the importance of predictability of results in
allowing parties to a contract to know and be aware of what law would
settle a potential dispute. 8' The court then noted that in insurance contracts,
parties are more likely to believe that the state's law where the policy was
issued, negotiated, paid for, and applied for would govern lawsuits
involving the insurance contract. 82
The court's next few steps in the Leflar analysis included the following
considerations: 1) maintenance of interstate and international order; 2) sim-
plification of judicial task; and 3) advancement of the forum's interests. 83
The court determined that maintenance of interstate and international order
did not require an application of Montana law to avoid friction and facilitate
commerce. 84 It also found that neither law was favored by a simplification
of judicial tasks, as it was determined irrelevant because either state's law
could be applied in the case without difficulty.85 On the question of ad-
vancement of governmental interests, the court concluded that North
Dakota prevailed due to its articulated interest in UIM by mandating
coverage and limiting stacking.86 Finally the court looked at the last step in
Leflar's analysis, application of a better rule of law. 87 The court did not
77. Id. l 10, 687 N.W.2d at 230-3 1.
78. Id. J 13, 687 N.W.2d at 231 (citing Daley v. Am. States Preferred Ins. Co., 1998 ND 225,
10, 587 N.W.2d 159, 161).
79. Id. The Montana contacts included situs of the accident, two parties involved in the colli-
sion were from the state as well as the witnesses, authorities from the state responded to the
accident, medical bills were incurred there, a blood alcohol content test was performed there, and
a tort action was initiated in the state. Id. 5 14, 687 N.W.2d at 231-32. The North Dakota contacts
included; the Wamsleys were from North Dakota, Nodak was a North Dakota company and did
not issue policies in Montana, the Nodak policies at issue covered North Dakota vehicles and were
issued in North Dakota, the Wamsleys contracted for and initiated the policies in North Dakota,
the Wamsleys also paid their premiums in the state, the forms used by Nodak were approved by
North Dakota, four of the Wamsley heirs live in North Dakota, and the co-personal representatives
of the estate were from North Dakota. Id. 5 15,687 N.W.2d at 232.
80. Id. 16.
81. Id.J 17.
82. Id. T 19, 687 N.W.2d at 233.
83. Id. 55 20, 21, 687 N.W.2d at 233-34.
84. Id. 20.
85. Id. J 21.
86. Id. at 234.
87. Id. 5 22.
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come to a conclusion on this matter, as it did not need to be decided
because the Wamsley heirs stated this factor should not influence the
decision. 88 The court ultimately determined that North Dakota had the most
significant contacts and interest in regard to the insurance contract issue.
89
Justice Maring dissented, finding that the declaratory action was
premature and that Leflar's factors had not been appropriately applied. 90
The declaratory action was premature due to the unresolved factual issue of
a damages amount from the tort action which triggered UIM, and because it
encouraged piecemeal litigation.9' Additionally, Justice Maring contended
the factors were inappropriately applied as the majority relied too heavily
on the lex loci doctrine, or the territorial approach, which was inconsistent
with North Dakota case law. 92 The majority relied on the location in which
the insurance contract was created, and Justice Maring's dissent contended
it should not have been the deciding factor, as there were other relevant
interests in Montana that were not sufficiently considered. 93 Further,
according to Justice Maring, the majority failed to apply the significant
contacts test and Leflar choice-of-law factors appropriately by failing to
give all the considerations proper weight.9 4
88. Id. at 234-35.
89. Id. T 23, 687 N.W.2d at 235.
90. Id. 5 27 (Maring, J., dissenting).
91. Id. fJ 29-30.
92. Id. 32, 687 N.W.2d at 236.
93. Id. 36, 687 N.W.2d at 236-37. The Montana interests not considered included the
nature of insurance contracts, medical bills issued there, and the public policy of Montana to
financially protect individuals injured between its borders. Id. 5 37.
94. Id,
20051
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COURTS-NATURE, EXTENT, AND EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION-
JURISDICTION OF THE PERSON
BOLINSKE V. HERD
In September 1998, Robert Bolinske contacted a lawyer, Thomas Herd,
at the law firm of Gaddis, Kin & Herd, P.C. (Gaddis), on behalf of two
North Dakota residents, the Schorsches, who had been involved in an
automobile accident in Colorado.95 Later that same month, Bolinske con-
tacted Herd stating his belief that he would receive one third of the
attorney's fees generated from the case, while Gaddis would receive the
other two-thirds of the attorney's fees. 96 Herd countered that the topic of
fee division had only briefly been raised and that fees would only be
divided if Bolinske took part in the case, as Colorado's rules regarding
professional conduct did not permit referral fees.97 Herd agreed to repre-
sent the Schorsches and filed a complaint in Colorado district court on their
behalf.98 The Gaddis firm contacted people or entities in North Dakota at
least 168 times regarding the representation of the Schorsches. 99 However,
all "legal pleadings and discovery were conducted either in or from
Colorado."100 Gaddis deposed a North Dakota doctor over the telephone,
but no one from the Gaddis firm ever entered the state of North Dakota for
any reason during the litigation period.10' Bolinske contacted Gaddis in
January 2001 regarding the case and was informed that Herd had settled the
case on behalf of the Schorsches. 102 Bolinske contacted the Gaddis firm
two more times over the next twelve months regarding the fee arrangement
and was told by the senior partner that the matter would be checked into.
However, in July 2002, Bolinske filed suit in the South Central District
Court after no reply was received.103 The trial court dismissed Bolinske's
claim, holding that Bolinske had "failed to demonstrate that Herd subjected
himself along with Gaddis to personal jurisdiction in North Dakota."104
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of Bolinske's suit, as
he failed to demonstrate the applicability of North Dakota Rule of Civil
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Procedure 4(b)(2) to Herd or Gaddis, and did not "satisfy the first three
determinative factors for assessing personal jurisdiction." 105
The court first explained the test for determining whether it has
personal jurisdiction over a party.106 As a threshold question, the court
needed to determine if the forum state's long-arm provision granted
jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant, and if so, it needed to then
determine if the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident party
provided due process.107 Satisfaction of due process necessitates that the
nonresident defendant have "sufficient minimum contacts with North
Dakota so the exercise of personal jurisdiction does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."' 08 For personal jurisdiction to
exist, at least one of the subparagraphs of North Dakota Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(b) must be satisfied.109 In analyzing sub-section 4(b)(2), the
court acknowledged that the phrase "transacting business" required
expansive interpretation and ought to be "used in a broader sense than
merely doing business."" 0 The court then cited Auction Effertz, Ltd. v.
Schecher,"'1 which held that initiating contact by telephone or some other
electronic medium with a resident in search of a service or product is, in
general, sufficient to demonstrate that the nonresident conducted a business
transaction "for purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction."' 2
However, the court qualified this statement by clarifying that "transacting
business ... does not extend to activities relating to third parties or to other
transactions that are not related to the activity in question under Rule
4(b)(2)(B)."113 The court rejected Bolinske's argument that Herd's use of
an interstate telephone system qualified Herd as having conducted business
in North Dakota.1l 4 Bolinske's reliance on Auction Effertz was misplaced
because in that case, contact with a North Dakota resident was initiated by a
nonresident, as compared to the instant case where a resident (Bolinske)
initiated the contact by seeking services from a nonresident.1 5 Moreover,
105. Id. 18, 689 N.W.2d at 403.
106. Id. 6at 400.
107. Id. (citing Ensign v. Bank of Baker, 2004 ND 56, 1 9, 676 N.W.2d 786, 790).
108. Id. 9, 689 N.W.2d at 400-01 (quoting Ensign, 5 9, 676 N.W.2d at 790).
109. Id.
110. Id. 10, 689 N.W.2d at 401 (quoting United Accounts, Inc. v. Quackenbush, 434
N.W.2d 567, 570 (N.D. 1989)).
111. 2000 ND 109,611 N.W.2d 173.
112. Bolinske, 5 10, 689 N.W.2d at 401(citing Auction Effertz, Ltd., v. Schecher, 2000 ND
109, T8,611 N.W.2d 173, 177).
113. Id.
114. Id. 5 11.689N.W.2dat401.
115. Id.
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the court reasoned that since Bolinske solicited Herd to represent the
Schorsches in Colorado, any contract would have been entered into in
Colorado, not North Dakota.116 The court stated that "because Herd and
Gaddis did not transact business, contract to supply services to Bolinske, or
enjoy other legal status in North Dakota, the requirements under North
Dakota Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b)(2) had not been satisfied."' 17
The court concluded that because Gaddis and Herd possessed insuf-
ficient contacts with North Dakota, the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over each of them would "offend traditional notions of justice and fair play
under the concept of due process.""18 In reaching this conclusion, the court
utilized a five-factor analysis to assess whether personal jurisdiction could
be exercised over the nonresident defendants." 9 Of the five factors to be
considered, the court stated that the first three factors were determinative:
"(1) the nature and quality of a nonresident defendant's contacts with the
forum state; (2) the quantity of the nonresident defendant's contacts with
the forum state; [and] (3) the relation of the cause of action to the
contacts." 120 The last two factors, "the forum state's interest in providing a
forum for its residents, and the convenience of the parties" were not as
important and therefore were not determinative."' 121 The court was per-
suaded by a Montana Supreme Court case in which Montana residents were
referred by a Montana attorney to an Idaho attorney for representation in a
claim regarding an automobile accident that occurred in Idaho.122 Presented
with those facts, the Montana Supreme Court held that jurisdiction "was not
acquired through interstate communications under a contract to be per-
formed in another state despite the fact the Idaho attorney sent the contin-
gency fee agreement and other letters to Montana."1 23 Comparatively, since
the "nature, quality, and quantity of the contacts" between Herd, Gaddis,
and Bolinske were minimal and initiated by Bolinske, the court found that
Gaddis and Herd's contacts did not meet the requirements of factors one
and two of the due process personal jurisdiction test. 124
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. 5 12.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 401-02 (citing Ensign v. Bank of Baker, 2004 ND 56, T 12, 676 N.W.2d 786,
791).
122. Id. 5 14, 689 N.W.2d at 402 (citing Bird v. Hiller, 892 P.2d 931, 934 (Mont. 1995).
123. Id.
124. Id. 5 15.
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CRIMINAL LAW -INCONSISTENT VERDICTS
STATE V. MCCLARY
In State v. McClary,125 Michael J. McClary was convicted of the crime
of abuse and neglect of a child.126 In affirming McClary's conviction, the
North Dakota Supreme Court held that the verdicts on separate charges
were not inconsistent and were supported by the evidence, and that the trial
court did not err in refusing to dismiss the abuse or neglect charge, or in
instructing the jury on that charge. 27 Finally, the court held that the trial
court did not err in refusing to question the jury about its verdict.128
McClary lived with his girlfriend and her fifteen-month-old daugh-
ter. 29 On October 15, 2002, the child was pronounced dead at the local
hospital because of shaken baby syndrome. 130 Evidence showed that both
McClary and his girlfriend had been using drugs, and each was alone with
the child.131 Both adults blamed the other for the child's death.132
The State charged McClary with three crimes.133 First, the State
"charged McClary with murder.., for allegedly causing [the child's] death
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
human life."' 134 Next, the State charged McClary with "committing or
attempting to commit a felony offense against a child" and causing the
death of a child in the furtherance of the crime.135 Finally, the State
charged McClary with abuse or neglect of a child "for willfully inflicting
bodily injury, substantial bodily injury, or serious bodily injury upon a child
under the age of six years." 36 The jury found McClary not guilty of
murder, but guilty of abuse or neglect of a child.137 McClary requested that
the jury specify the abuse or neglect of which he was guilty, but the court
denied this request and also denied his motion for judgment of acquittal on
the abuse or neglect charge.138
125. 2004 ND 98,679 N.W.2d 455.
126. McClary, T 1,679 N.W.2d at 456.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 456-57.
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On appeal, McClary argued that the jury verdicts of not guilty on the
murder charge and guilty on the child abuse and neglect charge were incon-
sistent.1 39 McClary argued that the court should adopt the more liberal
approach of the Alaska Supreme Court on the subject of inconsistent
verdicts.140 The North Dakota Supreme Court declined to do so and instead
relied on its decision in State v. Klosel4' to find that the verdicts were
consistent.142 According to Klose, inconsistent verdicts should be recon-
ciled by "examining both the law in the case and the evidence to ascertain
whether the verdict represents a logical and probable decision on the
relevant issues submitted to the jury."14 3
In its instructions, the trial court stated that the jury could find McClary
guilty of murder if it found McClary had willfully caused the child's death
under extreme indifference for human life.144 The jury was also instructed
that it could find McClary guilty if he "committed or attempted to commit a
felony offense against a child and, in the course of and in furtherance of
such crime, caused ... [the child's death]."145 The court determined that
certain terminology used in the jury instructions was confusing and should
have been avoided.146 The court also noted that the "felony offense" that
needed to be committed for felony murder was never defined. 147 Therefore,
the jury's verdicts could be rationally explained and were not
inconsistent. 148
McClary first argued it was obvious error that the trial court failed to
dismiss the abuse or neglect of a child count, and that the court further
139. ld. 5 4.
140. Id. At the time of the McClary case, the court followed the approach of the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984). In Powell, the Court upheld
a conviction based on an inconsistent verdict because "[t]he most that can be said ... is that the
verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real
conclusions, but that does not show that they were not convinced of the defendant's guilt."
Powell, 469 U.S. at 64-65 (quoting Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932)). Under this
approach, the defendant could challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the guilty
verdict, and where the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction on the compound offense, it
was speculation to suggest that the conviction was a mistake and that the acquittal on the predicate
offense was the verdict the jury really meant. Id. at 67-68. Meanwhile, Alaska declined to follow
this rationale based on state law and required consistent verdicts on multiple counts against a
single defendant. DeSacia v. State, 469 P.2d 369, 375-78 (Alaska 1970).
141. 2003 ND 39, 657 N.W.2d 276.
142. McClary, 2004 ND 98, 55 13-14, 679 N.W.2d at 462.
143. Klose, 9 44, 657 N.W.2d at 286 (quoting Moszer v. Witt, 2001 ND 30, 1 11, 622
N.W.2d 223, 229).
144. McClary, 5 14, 16 679 N.W.2d at 462.
145. Id. 5 16, 679 N.W.2d at 462-63.
146. id. at 463.
147. Id.
148. Id. 5 17.
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instructed the jury on that count. 149 He contended that these obvious errors
violated double jeopardy.150 However, the court rejected the double jeop-
ardy argument because McClary was only prosecuted once on two different
charges.151 The court also rejected McClary's assertion of trial court error
in instructing the jury on the abuse or neglect charge.152 The court noted
that McClary's argument ignored that he was charged under alternative
theories of murder and that abuse or neglect of a child is not a lesser-
included offense of felony murder. 53
Secondly, McClary argued that the trial court erred when it refused to
question the jury regarding its guilty verdict.154 The court noted that while
the statute required the judge to ascertain whether the verdict conformed to
the law of the case, nothing in the statute's language required the court to
question the jurors about how they reached their verdict.155 Therefore, the
court found that the trial court did not err in refusing to question the jurors
regarding the verdict. 5 6 Finally, McClary argued that the trial court erred
in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial.157 The
North Dakota Supreme Court found sufficient evidence to support the con-
viction and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
the motion for a new trial. 158 As a result, the court affirmed McClary's
convictions on child abuse and neglect charges. 159
CRIMINAL LAW-REASONABLE SUSPICION-SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE-
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
STATE V. SMITH
In State v. Smith,' 60 Jesse Smith appealed two convictions for "unlaw-
ful possession of drug paraphernalia and possession of a controlled
substance."' 61 The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that there was
149. Id. 18.





155. Id. TT 23-24, 679 N.W.2d at 465.
156. Id. S 24.
157. Id. T 25.
158. Id. T 26-27.
159. Id. T 28.
160. 2005 ND 21, 691 N.W.2d 203.
161. Smith,S 1, 691 N.W.2d at 206.
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no reasonable and articulable suspicion for the stop and therefore reversed
the convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. 162
On May 25, 2002, Fessenden Police Chief Allen Kluth received
information about a suspicious vehicle leaving the Cenex station parking lot
after being approached by two local citizens. 163 Chief Kluth testified that
the two citizens told him about a green station wagon pulling quickly out of
the parking lot and spinning.164 The two citizens told Chief Kluth they
followed the vehicle, but were unable to get a complete license plate num-
ber because the vehicle was traveling rapidly.165 The Cenex station had
been broken into several times, so Chief Kluth and Highway Patrol Officer
Skogen went to look at the tire tracks.166 Chief Kluth then contacted
Harvey Police Officer Balfour and told him to watch for a westbound green
station wagon. 167 Officer Balfour testified he observed a green station
wagon and then radioed a description of the vehicle to Chief Kluth, who
instructed Officer Balfour to stop the vehicle.168 Officer Balfour also
testified that there were no observable traffic violations when he pulled the
vehicle over.169
Upon approach of the vehicle, Officer Balfour observed an open case
of beer in the back seat and noticed a strong odor of alcohol from inside the
vehicle.170 Officer Balfour asked Smith to return to the police car with him
and "told Smith of the suspicious activity in the Cenex parking lot."171
Smith explained that he and his friend needed to use the bathroom at the
Cenex station, but the store was closed, "so they went outside by the bulk
fuel truck." 72 Officer Balfour testified that Smith then gave him permis-
sion to search his vehicle. 173
Officer Balfour told Patrolman Skogan of Smith's consent to a search
of his vehicle upon Skogan's arrival at the scene. 174 Officer Balfour took
Smith's passenger, 20-year-old Travis Cunningham, and placed him in the
back of his police car.175 Officer Balfour testified he saw two spilled cans
162. Id. 32, 691 N.W.2d at 213.








171. Id. at 207.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. 5 4.
175. Id.
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of beer on the floor of the vehicle and a backpack in the backseat containing
"eight rolled baggies of marijuana."1 76
Smith was charged with four counts, including possession of drug para-
phernalia, possession of a controlled substance, possession of a controlled
substance with the intent to deliver, and delivery of alcohol to a person
under twenty-one. 77 The district court consolidated the charges, and Smith
moved to suppress not only all of his statements made during the arrest, but
also all of the items seized in the arrest.'7 8 In October 2003, the district
court denied Smith's motion to suppress, and in March 2004, a jury found
him guilty of all charges except intent to distribute. 7 9 Smith appealed his
conviction on possession of drug paraphernalia and possession of a con-
trolled substance.18 0 Initially, the State claimed Smith lost his right to
appeal based on a discrepancy in the case numbers on his motion to sup-
press. 81 However, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the
discrepancy was a clerical error, and therefore Smith retained his right to
appeal. 8 2
The court noted that a traffic stop is considered a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment and summarized the elements of a "Terry" stop.' 83 To
justify a Fourth Amendment intrusion, the investigating officer must
possess "a reasonable suspicion that a law has been or is being violated."1
8 4
The State argued the facts in State v. Corum185 were similar to the facts
in the present case.' 86 In Corum, the court stated a known area of criminal
activity represented an articulable fact, but not enough to give rise to a
reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity. 8 7 The additional facts of a vehi-
cle stopped on the highway at 4:00 a.m. near a previously burglarized anhy-
drous ammonia tank, with two occupants being outside with a flashlight,





180. Id. 5 10. 691 N.W.2d at 208.
181. Id. J 8,691 N.W.2d at 207-08.
182. Id. 5 10, 691 N.W.2d at 208.
183. Id. 12. A Terry stop analysis requires the court to: "(1) determine whether the facts
warranted the intrusion of the individual's Fourth Amendment rights, and if so, (2) determine
whether the scope of the intrusion was reasonably related to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place." Id. (quoting State v. Sarheqyi, 492 N.W.2d 284, 286 (N.D. 1992)).
184. Id.
185. 2003 ND 89, 663 N.W.2d 151.
186. Smith, J 18,691 N.W.2d at 209.
187. Id. (citing Corum, 5 13, 663 N.W.2d at 155-56).
188. Id. (citing Corum, 16, 663 N.W.2d at 156).
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Smith argued the facts in State v. Sarhegyi189 were similar to the facts
in his case.190 In Sarhegyi, the officer noticed the presence of an occupied
vehicle stopped in a parking lot late at night.191 The Sarhegyi court con-
cluded the fact that the car began to leave as the officer approached was not
sufficient to create reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigative stop. 192
The Smith court concluded the facts were closer to the fact pattern in
Sarhegyi.193 Smith and Cunningham were sitting in their car in the Cenex
station parking lot around midnight. 194 The court did not consider the fact
that Smith and Cunningham pulled out of the parking lot at a high rate of
speed as two strangers approached their vehicle to be unreasonable or
suspicious. 195
The court rejected several different theories advanced by the state to
justify the unlawful search and seizure. 196 The court concluded none of the
remedial measures suggested by the state could overcome the unlawful stop
of the vehicle. 197 Therefore, finding no reasonable and articulable suspicion
for the stop, the court reversed the judgments and remanded the case. '98
CRIMINAL LAW - SEARCHES AND SEIZURES - ARREST
STATE V. LINGHOR
Matthew Linghor was a passenger in a vehicle when a Williams
County deputy sheriff commenced a traffic stop of that vehicle.199 Upon
stopping the vehicle, the deputy detected the odor of anhydrous ammonia
emanating from the vehicle and saw in plain view in the back seat what he
determined were drug-manufacturing materials.200 While awaiting assis-
tance, the deputy questioned William Ostwald, the driver.20' Ostwald
claimed that one of the items in the back seat of the car, a can of paint
189. 492 N.W.2d 284 (N.D. 1992).
190. Smith, 5 19,691 N.W.2d at 209-10.
191. Id. at 210 (citing Sarhegyi, 492 N.W.2d at 287).
192. Id.
193. Id. T 20.
194. Id.
195. Id. The court noted that fleeing from a marked police vehicle could be considered
suspicious and unreasonable. Id.
196. Id. T 29, 691 N.W.2d at 212. The State suggested search incident to arrest, the
automobile exception, and inevitable discovery to justify the unlawful arrest. Id. 5 28.
197. Id. 5 25-29, 691 N.W.2d at 211-12.
198. ld. T 23-33,691 N.W.2d at 211-13.
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thinner, belonged to Linghor.202 After the requested assistance arrived on
the scene, it was determined that the car was in fact a mobile metham-
phetamine laboratory, and Ostwald was placed under arrest.203 Linghor was
subsequently removed from the automobile, subjected to a pat-down search,
and was requested to empty the contents of his pockets. 204 Linghor com-
plied and produced a Wal-Mart receipt that listed items that were both
present in the vehicle, and as noted by the officers, capable of being used in
the manufacture of methamphetamine. 205 Approximately twenty minutes
after discovery of the receipt, Linghor was formally placed under arrest.2 06
Further interviews of Ostwald and Linghor conducted at the scene between
the time of the production of the receipt by Linghor and Linghor's formal
arrest resulted in Linghor and Ostwald's alleged confirmation that Linghor
had indeed purchased certain items listed on the receipt.207
At trial, Linghor's attempts to suppress the Wal-Mart receipt and his
statements admitting that he purchased the items listed thereon were unsuc-
cessful, and the receipt, as well as the statements, were admitted into
evidence.208 After Linghor's trial resulted in a hung jury, the State retried
Linghor, this time including an additional State witness who "resolved
factual inconsistencies in the State's case," and Linghor was subsequently
convicted.2 09
All evidence obtained by an unreasonable search or seizure may not be
admitted into evidence in accordance with the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 8 of the North Dakota
Constitution.2 10 In the instant case, a warrantless search was conducted
which led to the discovery of the Wal-Mart receipt.21 l Therefore, in order
for the Wal-Mart receipt to be admitted into evidence, the search that
uncovered the receipt must be shown to have fallen "within a recognized
exception to the warrant requirement." 21 2 The exception considered by the
court as being applicable to the request for admission of the Wal-Mart







208. Id. at 203-04.
209. Id. at 204.
210. Id. T14.
211. Id.
212. Id. (citing State v. Kunkel, 455 N.W.2d 208, 209-10 (N.D. 1990)).
213. Id. 5,690 N.W.2d at 205.
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Two major considerations were discussed by the court with regard to the
applicability of this exception: (1) whether Linghor's presence in the auto-
mobile was, by itself, sufficient to create probable cause to conduct the
search in question; and (2) whether the twenty-minute delay between the
discovery of the Wal-Mart receipt and Linghor's formal arrest violated the
search incident to a valid custodial arrest exception.214
The court applied the reasoning utilized by the United States Supreme
Court in the factually analogous case Maryland v. Pringle215 in determining
whether Linghor's presence in the automobile was, by itself, sufficient to
create probable cause to conduct the search in question.2t 6 The Pringle
Court articulated probable cause as a "fluid concept-turning on the
assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts-not readily, or
even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules. '217 Therefore, if there] is
a reasonable ground for belief of guilt, and that belief. . . particularized
with respect to the person to be searched or seized" probable cause will be
found to exist. 218 The Linghor court further clarified that under the Pringle
standard for determining whether such reasonable ground existed was that
of an objectively reasonable police officer.219
The court concluded that Linghor's presence in the automobile was, by
itself, sufficient to create probable cause.220 In reaching this conclusion, the
court cited factors that distinguished the instant case and Pringle from other
cases such as Ybarra v. Illinois, 221 where the mere propinquity of persons
was relied upon to create probable cause.222 In both the instant case and
Pringle, the parties in question were passengers in an automobile subjected
to a traffic stop, as opposed to the situation in Ybarra where the party in
question was an unwitting patron of a public tavern subjected to a search by
virtue of officers investigating an unrelated incident. 223 The court in the
instant case relied upon the line of reasoning established in Wyoming v.
Houghton,224 that "a car passenger-unlike the unwitting tavern patron in
214. Id. 5 6.
215. 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003).
216. Id. T 6.
217. Id. T 10, 690 N.W.2d at 206 (quoting Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 400 (2003)).
218. Id.; see also Pringle, 540 U.S. at 370-71 (articulating the standard of probable cause
established by the Court).
219. Linghor, T 10, 690 N.W.2d at 206 (citing State v. Overby, 1999 ND 47, T 13, 590
N.W.2d 703, 707).
220. Id. 12.
221. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
222. Linghor, T 12, 690 N.W.2d at 206.
223. Id.
224. 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
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Ybarra-will often be engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and
have the same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their
wrongdoing." 225 Thus, in light of the circumstances, the court found that an
inference of common enterprise between Linghor and the other passengers
in the car was reasonable, especially where large amounts of drug para-
phernalia and the "immediately noticeable" smell of anhydrous ammonia
coming from the automobile were present. 226 The court concluded that the
existence of the drug paraphernalia and the smell from the car could lead "a
reasonable officer [to] conclude that there was probable cause to believe
[Linghor] committed the crime of possession of [drug paraphernalia relating
to methamphetamine] either solely or jointly." 227
In determining whether the twenty-minute delay between the discovery
of the Wal-Mart receipt and Linghor's formal arrest violated the search
incident to a valid custodial arrest exception, the court noted that "an
officer's subjective intent or outward statements do not necessarily control
whether, or when, a party is under arrest." 228 The court further clarified that
when an arrest occurs is determined through a totality of the circumstances
test.229 The court articulated that "an arrest can occur before an officer
formally informs a suspect he is under arrest ... [t]he proper, objective test
asks whether circumstances existed that would have caused a reasonable
person to conclude he was under arrest and not free to leave." 230 The court
stated that a reasonable person in Linghor's situation would have deter-
mined that he was under arrest at the time that he was removed from the
automobile by the officer conducting the traffic stop. 231 As the court elab-
orated, "[W]e do not believe a reasonable person, found in an automobile
smelling of anhydrous ammonia with an abundance of drug paraphernalia
in plain sight, would feel free to exit the car, much less leave the crime
scene." 232
Additionally, Linghor argued that the conviction from his second trial
should be overturned because the district court erred in declaring a mistrial
and hung jury in the first case, thereby creating a double jeopardy
violation.233 Linghor contended that a short jury deliberation period prior to
225. Linghor, 5 11, 690 N.W.2d at 207.
226. Id. 111-12.
227. Id. 12 (citations omitted).
228. Id. 14, 690 N.W.2d at 207-08.
229. Id. at 208.
230. Id. (citing Wishnatsky v. Bergquist, 1996 ND 156, 5 15, 550 N.W.2d 394, 398).
231. Id. 15.
232. Id.
233. Id. S 18, 690 N.W.2d at 209.
2005]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
the jury's announcement that it was hung, and the jury's inability to answer
"relatively simple factual questions as to which there were inconsistencies
in the State's case," necessitated that the case be overturned on double
jeopardy grounds. 234 However, the court cited precedent which clarified
that "in cases which a mistrial has been declared prior to verdict, the con-
clusion that jeopardy has attached begins, rather than ends, the inquiry as to
whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial." 235 The court noted that
the Double Jeopardy Clause does not always prohibit retrial when the first
trial was terminated before a verdict was reached.2 36 The critical deter-
mination, the court stated, was "what, if anything, the State did during the
trial to trigger a dismissal." 237 In this case, the prosecution pinpointed the
confusion that led to the hung jury and mistrial in the first case, a discrep-
ancy regarding numbers printed on a hardware store receipt, and conse-
quently clarified it.238 The court concluded that although this clarification
"presumably aided the State, this is not the type of benefit that implicates
the Double Jeopardy Clause." 239 Because every case involves decisions
about what evidence should be presented to a jury, mistakes are inevitable,
and simply because confusion ensues and a jury is unable to reach a verdict,
this does not necessarily lead to double jeopardy.
240
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE
STATE V. GUSCETTE
In State v. Guscette,24 1 Stephanie Guscette appealed her conviction for
possession of drug paraphernalia. 242 Guscette entered a conditional guilty
plea, which reserved her right to appeal the denied motion to suppress
evidence found in her purse as a result of a vehicle search by law enforce-
ment. 243 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court and
held that there was sufficient evidence showing that Guscette had not been
seized under the Fourth Amendment when law enforcement searched her
234. Id.
235. Id. 5 20 (citing Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467 (1973)).
236. Id. at 210 (citing State v. Allesi, 216 N.W.2d 805, 814 (N.D. 1974)).
237. Id.
238. Id. 55 23-24, 690 N.W.2d at 211-12.
239. Id. T 25.
240. Id.
241. 2004 ND 71,678 N.W.2d 126.
242. Guscette, T 1, 678 N.W.2d at 127.
243. Id. 5 4, 678 N.W.2d at 128.
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vehicle, and that her consent to the vehicle search was sufficient to search
her purse contained inside the vehicle.244
On February 4, 2003, a Fargo police officer stopped Guscette for a
broken taillight.245 The officer informed Guscette the reason for the stop
and asked to check her driver's license.2 46 The officer checked the driver's
license and upon returning the license to her, asked Guscette about her
vehicle insurance and the whereabouts of Corey Mock.247 While continuing
to speak to Guscette, the officer had her step out of the vehicle. 248 The
officer then informed her that he was only giving her a warning and she was
free to leave.2 49 Before Guscette left, the officer asked her if she had any
"weapons, needles, knives, or anything else illegal in the vehicle." 250
Guscette replied that she did not.25' The officer then asked for permission
to search the car, and Guscette consented. 252 During the search, the officer
found drug paraphernalia in a black purse that was located in the front seat
of the vehicle.2 53 The officer testified that after he found the contraband, he
heard Guscette recite to the other officer that she had consented to a search
of the vehicle and not her purse; Guscette contended that the officer had not
yet found the paraphernalia when she objected to the search of her purse.
254
While Guscette admitted that the initial traffic stop was valid, she
argued that her Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable seizure
was violated when the officer continued to detain her beyond the time
necessary to complete the initial stop.2 55 The court cited State v. Mertz256
for the standard of a reasonable investigatory stop.257 Under this standard,
the stop may continue as long as reasonably necessary to conduct the duties
resulting from the stop.258 Once these activities are concluded, the officer
violates the Fourth Amendment if he continues to detain the individual
244. Id. 5 1,678 N.W.2d at 127.
245. Id. 2.
246. Id.
247. Id. Corey Mock was a roommate of Guscette whom law enforcement had been trying
to locate. Id. 19, 678 N.W.2d at 132.







255. Id. 5 6, 678 N.W.2d at 128.
256. 32 N.W.2d 410 (N.D. 1985).
257. Guscette, 5 7, 678 N.W.2d at 129.
258. Id.
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without having reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity.259 The
North Dakota Supreme Court found that since the officer returned Gus-
cette's driver's license and told her she was free to leave before he asked for
permission to search the vehicle, Guscette was not seized under the Fourth
Amendment. 260
The court then considered the validity of the consent received to search
the vehicle. 261 To determine whether consent is valid, the court must look
at the voluntariness of the consent under the totality of circumstances to de-
termine whether the consent was a product of free choice and not a product
of coercion. 262 The court must look to "the characteristics and condition of
the accused at the time [he or she] confessed or consented and ... the
details of the setting in which the consent or confession was obtained," and
no one factor alone can be determinative. 263 The court then upheld the trial
court's findings that Guscette was not threatened or forced to consent and
the consent was not a product of coercion; Guscette admitted that at no time
during the incident was she nervous. 264 Therefore, the court concluded that
under the totality of the circumstances, Guscette voluntarily consented to
the search. 265
Finally, the court determined whether the consent covered the whole
scope of the search. 266 In Florida v. Jimeno,267 the United States Supreme
Court determined that "general consent to search a car includes a consent to
search containers within the vehicle which may contain the items
sought." 268 The North Dakota Supreme Court found that since the officer
was searching for "weapons, knives or anything else illegal in the vehicle,"
and these items could have been found in the purse, the officer was
reasonable in searching the purse. 269 Guscette put no limitation on her
initial consent to search, and if she did indeed withdraw her consent, it was
after the contraband had already been discovered.270 Therefore, the court
259. Id.
260. Id. 9-10, 678 N.W.2d at 130.
261. Id. J11,678 N.W.2d at 131.





267. 500 U.S. 248 (1991).
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affirmed the district court, ruling that the consent was valid and the
paraphernalia was within the scope of the voluntary consent search. 27'
Justice Maring dissented, finding that the detention was an unrea-
sonable seizure and that the consent was not given under circumstances
sufficient to purge the taint of the illegal detention. 272 The dissent pointed
out that prior to Guscette giving her voluntary consent to search the vehicle,
the officer had been questioning her about drug charges that were currently
pending against Guscette, and about Corey Mock, her roommate.2 73 This
was beyond the scope of information needed to complete the traffic stop,
and therefore the officer had illegally detained her with the continued
questions.2 74 Given the illegal detention, the circumstances surrounding the
consent must have been sufficient to purge the taint of illegality in order for
the consent to be valid.275 Justice Maring argued that the taint could not
have been purged merely by the officer informing Guscette she was only
receiving a verbal warning and telling her that "you are free to leave." 276
Chief Justice VandeWalle also wrote separately to point out that this
case was not in fact analogous with State v. Everson,277 and to assert his
agreement with Justice Maring's dissent.278
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-WAIVER AND CONSENT
STATE V. MITZEL
Ryan Mitzel appealed a district court criminal conviction entered upon
a conditional guilty plea for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver
and possession of drug paraphernalia.2 79 Mitzel claimed was obtained in
violation of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights, and therefore argued
that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress that evi-
dence.2 80 In an opinion written by Justice Sandstrom, the North Dakota
Supreme Court reversed and remanded. 28' The court concluded that the
district court erred when it denied Mitzel's motion to suppress. 2 82
271. Id. at 131-32.
272. Id. IJ 37-38, 678 N.W.2d at 137 (Maring, J., dissenting).
273. Id. 5 19-20, 678 N.W.2d at 132.
274. Id. JSJ 25-26, 678 N.W.2d at 133.
275. Id. 31, 678 N.W.2d at 134 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975)).
276. Id. 37, 678 N.W.2d at 137.
277. 474 N.W.2d 695 (N.D. 1991).
278. Guscette, I 41-42, 678 N.W.2d at 137-38 (VandeWalle, C.J., dissenting).
279. State v. Mitzel, 2004 ND 157, 1 1,685 N.W.2d 120.
280. Id. at 122.
281. Id.
282. Id.
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In 2003, two Bismarck police officers were called to Mitzel's apart-
ment to investigate a report of a domestic dispute. 283. After being allowed
into the apartment, one of the officers followed Mitzel down a hallway
toward a back bedroom.284 The officer smelled marijuana and asked Mitzel
for permission to search the bedroom, but Mitzel refused.285 Mitzel was
then arrested for possession of marijuana. 2S6 After the arrest, the police at-
tempted to obtain a search warrant.2 87 A detective with the Bismarck Police
Department testified that it was taking some time to obtain a warrant, and
during this time, Mitzel said he did not want to wait any longer and gave
consent for a search of the bedroom.2 88 A search warrant was subsequently
not obtained because of Mitzel's alleged consent.289 Mitzel entered a
conditional plea of guilty, but reserved the right to appeal the denial of his
motion to suppress. 290 Mitzel was convicted of possession of marijuana
with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. 29'
On appeal, Mitzel argued that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress evidence found during a search of his apartment,
claiming he did not give consent for police to follow him to the bedroom.
2 92
Mitzel also claimed that there were no exigent circumstances justifying the
search and that his later consent was involuntary, and thus obtained in
violation of his Miranda rights. 293
The North Dakota Supreme Court began its analysis by explaining that
searching a home without a warrant is presumptively unreasonable. 294
However, searches inside a home are not unreasonable if the search falls
within one of the exceptions to the search warrant requirement. 295 If no
such exception exists, the evidence must be suppressed as inadmissible. 29
6
The court began by discussing one exception to a warrantless
search-consent. 297 Consent is measured objectively by what a reasonable




287. Id. 6, 685 N.W.2d at 123.
288. Id.





294. Id. 5 11 (citing State v. Matthews, 2003 ND 108, 5 10, 665 N.W.2d 28, 31-32).
295. Id.
296. Id. 1 12.
297. Id. T 13,685 N.W.2d at 124.
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person would have understood the exchange to be.298 To show consent, the
State must point to affirmative conduct by the person alleged to have
consented. 299 The court determined that the findings of fact in the present
case were insufficient to show consent.300 Therefore, the court held that the
district court's findings were "based on an erroneous conception of law"
and were "insufficient to constitute consent." 301
Next, the court discussed a second exception to a warrantless search,
exigent circumstances. 302 Exigent circumstances are present when there is
an emergency situation that requires quick action to prevent imminent
danger to life, serious damage to property, or to stop the imminent escape of
a suspect or the destruction of evidence. 303 The court held that although
domestic disputes can erupt without notice, the facts in this case were
insufficient to indicate an immediate search of the apartment was
justified. 304 The court stated that there was no evidence that Mitzel
prevented the police from entering the apartment, that Mitzel was violent or
intoxicated, or that there was an altercation or other emergency. 305 The
court concluded that because no warrant exception applied, the search was
unlawful and all evidence obtained from the search must be suppressed as
inadmissible under the exclusionary rule. 306
The court then addressed Mitzel's argument that the district court erred
in finding that his consent to search was valid. 307 The district court did not
appear to have considered the totality of the circumstances when addressing
the validity of the consent. 308 The court stated that because the evidence
obtained from the search must be excluded, there was no basis to arrest
Mitzel. 309 There were also two officers present when Mitzel consented, but
Mitzel was not given his Miranda warning until after he consented to the
search.310 The court held that the district court misapplied the law when it
determined that Mitzel's written consent to search was valid, and
298. Id.
299. Id. 14.
300. Id. 16, 685 N.W.2d at 125.




305. Id. 55 22-23, 685 N.W.2d at 126-27.
306. Id.
307. Id. T 24,685 N.W.2d at 127.
308. Id. 127.
309. Id. T 29,685 N.W.2d at 128.
310. Id.
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subsequently reversed the criminal judgment, vacated the order denying the
motion to suppress, and remanded the case. 311
Chief Justice Gerald VandeWalle dissented in the case, and argued that
the district court incorrectly applied the law to the facts of the case. 312 The
Chief Justice contended that exigent circumstances existed to justify the
police officers' actions. 313 Mitzel had invited the police into the home. 314
Once the police were inside the home, the potential danger to the officers
was much greater than any danger to them outside the home. 315 This
danger gave the officers greater latitude, even though it did not give the
officers freedom to wander freely throughout the home. 316 Chief Justice
VandeWalle argued that Mitzel's consent was not necessary under the facts
of this case, as another exigent circumstance was that the police could not
see the woman whom they had been sent to protect.317
The Chief Justice stated that the officer's warrantless search was
justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement. 318 The Chief Justice believed that the ensuing arrest was not
illegal and that the subsequent search of the home was voluntary, and
therefore valid under the circumstances. 319
CRIMINAL LAW-SENTENCING AND PUNISHMENT
GREYBULL V. STATE
In Greybull v. State,320 Danielle Greybull appealed the trial court's
denial of her application for post-conviction relief.32' Upon review, the
North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision on two
grounds. 322 First, the court held that Greybull failed to demonstrate that the
prosecutor's notice of intent to enhance her sentence was not filed within a
reasonable time prior to the trial, or that Greybull was prejudiced by a late





315. Id. at 129.
316. Id.
317. Id. 5 34-35.
318. Id. 5 36.
319. Id.
320. 2004 ND 116, 680 N.W.2d 254.
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the trial court failed to have the jury find the predicate facts supporting
Greybull's enhanced sentence. 324
In 1997, Greybull was convicted of manslaughter in the stabbing death
of Charlene Yellow Bear.325 The trial court ruled that she was a "dangerous
special offender" under North Dakota Century Code section 12.1-32-09.326
Thus, the trial court sentenced her to the maximum of twenty years in
prison.327 Upon appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the sen-
tence and the conviction. 328 Following the denial of her appeal, Greybull
filed two applications for post-conviction relief, which were both denied.329
In this, her third application for relief, Greybull raised two issues.330
First, she asserted that the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Apprendi v. New Jersey331 should be retroactively applied to her case.332
Second, she asserted that the prosecutor did not file a timely notice of intent
to enhance her sentence. 333
The North Dakota Supreme Court addressed the second argument
first. 334 Greybull argued that the prosecutor failed to provide the court with
adequate notice of his intent to seek an enhanced penalty under North
Dakota Century Code section 12.1-32-09(3).335 The prosecutor in the case
filed notice twenty days prior to trial. 336 The court rejected Greybull's
argument because she failed to assert that she had been prejudiced by lack
of notice. 337 Furthermore, the court held that Greybull's failure to raise this
issue earlier was an abuse of process, and therefore the argument had been
waived.338
Next, the court addressed Greybull's argument that Apprendi be
applied retroactively to her case.339 The court explained that Apprendi
stood for the proposition that facts used to enhance a criminal sentence
324. Id.
325. Id. T 2.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. (citing State v. Greybull, 1998 ND 102, J 30, 579 N.W.2d 161, 165).
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
332. Greybull, 2004 ND 116, 1 2, 680 N.W.2d 254, 255.
333. Id.
334. Id. T 3.
335. Id. Section 12.1-32-09(3) required the prosecutor to sign and file a notice of his inten-
tion to seek an enhanced penalty with the court "at a reasonable time before trial or acceptance by
the court of a plea of guilty." Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. 4.
338. Id. T 5, 680 N.W.2d at 256.
339. Id. T 6.
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beyond the statutory maximum must be decided not by the court, but by a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.340 Although the North Dakota Supreme
Court had not previously determined this issue, the court had held that
failure to retroactively apply Apprendi could constitute harmless error.341
The court noted that "[t]he one category of offenders deemed, per se,
dangerous is the category of offenders who use firearms, dangerous
weapons, or destructive devices in the commission of an offense." 342 In the
instant case, Greybull used a dangerous weapon, a knife, to kill the
victim. 343 She argued self-defense at trial. 344 According to the court, "The
only predicate fact upon which Greybull's sentence has been enhanced
under the special dangerous offender statute is that she used a dangerous
weapon to commit her crime. That fact was never in dispute." 345 Thus, the
court held that the failure of the jury to find that obvious fact was harmless
error and affirmed the order denying Greybull's application for post-
conviction relief.346
EMPLOYMENT LAW-RETALIATORY DISCHARGE
HENG v. ROTECH MEDICAL CORP.
In Heng v. Rotech Medical Corp.,347 plaintiff Debora Heng appealed a
summary judgment dismissal of her retaliatory discharge and breach of
contract claims against the defendant, Rotech Medical Corporation, doing
business as Arrowhealth Medical Supply (Arrowhealth), and the award of
attorney's fees to Rotech.348 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the
decision to dismiss the breach of contract claim, but reversed the dismissal
of the retaliatory discharge claim. 349
Arrowhealth supplied medical equipment to patients' homes, and Heng
was a manager at the Fargo Arrowhealth office. 350 As a part of its business,
Arrowhealth allowed its service technicians to assemble oxygen delivery
systems and instruct patients how to use them, even though the technicians
340. Id.
341. Id. 5 8 (citing Clark v. State, 2001 ND 9, 5 9, 621 N.W.2d 576, 579).





347. 2004 ND 204, 688 N.W.2d 389.
348. Hend, 5 1, 688 N.W.2d at 393.
349. Id.
350. Id. 5 2.
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were not licensed to do so. 351 When a new service technician was hired in
November 2001, the new employee informed Heng that Arrowhealth's
practice violated North Dakota law.352 Heng brought this information to the
regional manager, Adam Blumenshein, who assured her that Arrowhealth's
practices were legal. 353 On December 19, 2001, Heng again expressed
concern about the practice, this time to Arrowhealth's Corporate Com-
pliance Coordinator, Julie Johnson. 354 Arrowhealth then obtained a copy of
the relevant North Dakota law, and Blumenshein concluded that
Arrowhealth was not in violation of the law. 355 Heng then called the North
Dakota Respiratory Care Board (Board) anonymously and inquired about
the regulation.356 Heng was told that Arrowhealth's service technicians
were performing illegal functions by assembling the oxygen delivery
systems without a license. 357 Heng again contacted Johnson, who told
Heng to stop the service technicians from assembling the systems, but not
to tell anyone about the issue.358 Both Blumenshein and Johnson met with
Heng on January 3, 2002, and they discussed the regulation along with
ongoing personnel problems in the Fargo office. 359 On January 18, 2002,
Heng was fired.360
The North Dakota Supreme Court first analyzed whether the trial court
correctly dismissed Heng's breach of contract claim against Arrowhealth. 361
Heng alleged that the Arrowhealth employee manual required progressive
discipline and prohibited retaliatory termination for reporting suspected
health care violations. 362 The court began by stating that where an em-
ployee manual expressly states that it does not create a contract with an
employee, the employee has employment at-will. 363 The court found that





355. Id. 4; see also N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 105-03-01-02 (2005) (providing that the set up
and instruction about the use of medical devices related to respiratory care are prohibited without
a license).
356. Heng, T 5, 688 N.W.2d at 393.
357. Id.
358. ld. 6, 688 N.W.2d at 393-94.
359. Id. 7.
360. Id.
361. Id. 11, 688 N.W.2d at 394-95.
362. Id.
363. Id. 13, 688 N.W.2d at 395 (citing Olson v. Souris River Telcomms. Coop., Inc., 1997
ND 10, T 16, 558 N.W.2d 333, 336-37).
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will, and the manual did not create any contract claims. 364 Additionally,
Heng was required to sign an "Employee Corporate Compliance
Acknowledgment" when she was hired, which stated that employment was
at-will and no contract of employment was created.365 The court found that
after looking at all the employment documentation, there was clear
evidence that Heng's employment was at-will, and as a result the trial court
did not err in dismissing Heng's breach of contract claim. 366
The court next looked at Heng's retaliatory discharge claim and
whether summary judgment was proper.367 The court explained that there
is an exception to at-will employment when the employee has been
terminated and there is a statutory exception. 368 The court pointed to North
Dakota's whistle blower statute which prohibits an employer from dis-
charging an employee reporting a violation of the law to an employer in
good faith.369 The statute also allows the employee to bring a civil action
against the employer if the employer violates the statute. 370 The court
presented three steps for a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge under
the statute: "(1) the employee engaged in protected activity; (2) the
employer took adverse action against the employee; and (3) the existence of
a causal connection between the employee's protected activity and the
employer's adverse action." 371 The court found that the second prong of the
test was already met as Arrowhealth conceded it took adverse action against
Heng when she was fired.372
The court then turned to the first prong of the test, whether the
employee was engaged in a protected activity.373 Protected activity in-
cludes making a good faith report of a violation of a federal, state, or local
regulation or rule, to the employer, governmental body, or a law enforce-
ment official.374 Arrowhealth argued that since Heng did not report the
violations to the company's compliance hotline or to law enforcement or a
regulatory agency, she failed to show that she was engaged in a protected
364. Id. 5 14. The policy manual stated in several locations that the handbook was not a
contract, and on the last page of the manual, the employee is required to sign a disclaimer, which
includes the fact that employment is at-will. Id.
365. Id. 15, 688 N.W.2d at 396.
366. Id. 16.
367. Id. 5 17, 688 N.W.2d at 396-97.
368. Id. 18, 688 N.W.2d at 397.
369. Id. 1 19 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-20 (2004)).
370. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-20).
371. Id. (citing Anderson v. Meyer Broad. Co., 2001 ND 125, 28, 630 N.W.2d 46, 53).
372. Id. 20.
373. Id. 21.
374. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-20).
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activity. 375 The court stated that North Dakota's statute allows retaliatory
discharge actions where they are based on an employee's report of a
violation to the employer, and Heng had reported to her employer her
concerns about possible violations numerous times.376 The court found that
Heng did not lack good faith simply because she did not report the
violations to outside authorities.377
Arrowhealth further alleged that Heng did not report in good faith, as
the purpose of reporting was not to expose an illegal practice, pointing out
that Heng had stated in her deposition that she was worried about the
impact the illegal practice would have on the employees. 378 The court
concluded that since Heng repeatedly informed Arrowhealth about the
suspected violations and then went to the Board to receive clarification,
Heng's concern for the employees was construed as a secondary reason for
her reports. 379 The court then stated that it is a question of fact whether an
employee has made a report in good faith, summary judgment would not be
appropriate if reasonable minds could differ as to whether Heng made the
reports for the purpose of protecting employees or reporting an illegality. 380
On the first prong of the test, the court concluded that there was a genuine
issue of material fact, and the trial court erred in concluding that Heng
established she was engaged in a protected activity. 381
The court turned to the last prong of the test, whether there was a
causal connection between the protected activity and Heng's termination. 382
The court stated that causation requires more than termination after
reporting a violation, but an inference can be made that the action was
related to the protected activity where the employee's complaints are
directed toward the person who fired the employee. 383 In this case, the
court indicated that a fact finder could find causation and reasonable
proximity based upon that inference, as Heng had been making the majority
of her complaints to the individual who fired her, and on the day Heng was
terminated, she had made her last report by telephone. 384 Furthermore, an
inference can also be drawn where the individual who fires the employee
375. Id.






382. Id. 27, 688 N.W.2d at 398-99.
383. Id. 28, 688 N.W.2d at 399 (citing Anderson v. Meyer Broad. Co., 2001 ND 125, 5 35,
630 N.W.2d 46, 55).
384. Id. T 29.
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was involved in the reported activity, which also occurred in Heng's
situation. 385 The court noted other factors that could lead to this inference,
as Arrowhealth had not shown any evidence that Blumenshein attempted to
discover whether conditions had improved in the Fargo office before firing
Heng.386 Blumenshein also did not follow Arrowhealth's progressive disci-
pline policy when terminating Heng's employment. 387 The court stated that
considering these factors together, a genuine issue of material fact existed,
as a fact finder could reasonably draw an inference under the causation
prong. 388 Additionally, the court determined that the trial court erred when
it found that strong factors and strong causal connectors existed, but still
granted summary judgment to Arrowhealth.389
Finally, Arrowhealth argued that even if Heng had established a prima
facie case for retaliatory discharge, Arrowhealth carried its burden of
persuasion by showing a legitimate reason for firing Heng not related to
retaliation. 390 However, the court determined that burden shifting is not
required at the summary judgment stage, but at the trial stage, and Arrow-
health's argument did not convince the court to affirm summary judg-
ment. 391 The court concluded, based on an analysis of all the issues, that
the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment on the retaliatory
discharge claim along with attorney's fees for Arrowhealth, but the breach
of contract dismissal was proper.392
FAMILY LAW-CHILD CUSTODY
KOSTRZEWSKI V. FRISINGER
In Kostrzewski v. Frisinger,393 Shawn Kostrzewski appealed the district
court's refusal to grant his motion to dismiss and objection to the registra-
tion of a judgment from a Minnesota district court that established custody
of his child with Amy Frisinger. 394 The North Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed the district court's confirmation of the registration of the
Minnesota child custody judgment, but vacated the portion of the trial
385. Id. J 30.
386. Id. 31, 688 N.W.2d at 399-400.
387. Id. at 399.
388. Id. 32, 688 N.W.2d at 400.
389. Id. 34.
390. Id. 35.
391. Id. 37,688 N.W.2d at 401.
392. Id. 38.
393. 2004 ND 108, 680 N.W.2d 271.
394. Frisinger, T 1, 680 N.W.2d at 272.
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court's order that established it had jurisdiction under North Dakota
Century Code section 14-14.1-14 to modify the judgment.395
Shawn Kostrzewski and Amy Frisinger were never married, but
conceived a child that was born on November 5, 1999.396 In March 2001,
Ms. Frisinger married another man and moved to Fargo, North Dakota.397
In April 2001, Mr. Kostrzewski initiated the child custody determination in
Minnesota and also sought custody of the minor child.398 The Minnesota
district court entered judgment confirming Mr. Kostrzewski as the child's
father, establishing a visitation schedule, and granting Ms. Frisinger
physical custody of the child. 399
Subsequent to the entry of the judgment, Ms. Frisinger moved to
Burleigh County, North Dakota.40o Ms. Frisinger "filed the Minnesota
judgment with the Burleigh County District Court" and notified Mr.
Kostrzewski of the filing.401 Mr. Kostrzewski contested the filing and
brought a motion to dismiss. 402 The trial court determined that it "had
jurisdiction pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 14-14.1-14," rejected Mr. Kostrzewski's
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and "denied his objection to the
confirmation of' the Minnesota judgment. 403 Mr. Kostrzewski thereafter
appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court.4o4
While the court conceded that the order Mr. Kostrzewski was
appealing would traditionally be a non-appealable interlocutory order, the
court concluded that, pursuant to North Dakota Century Code section 28-
27-02(5), this order was appealable because it decided the merits of an
action.405 Additionally, the court pointed out that it will consider the
substance of a motion rather than what the motion is actually entitled.406
While Mr. Kostrzewski's motion was labeled a "motion to dismiss," it
objected to the registration of the Minnesota child custody judgment, which











405. Id. 55 8, 10, 680 N.W.2d at 273.
406. Id. I 10.
407. Id.
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On appeal, Mr. Kostrzewski argued that the North Dakota trial court
did not have the jurisdictional authority to determine the visitation issues,
and therefore the Minnesota judgment could not be registered in Burleigh
County.408 According to North Dakota Century Code section 14-14.1-
25(4), a court shall confirm a registered order unless it is established by a
person contesting such registration that the issuing court "did not have
jurisdiction"; the "child custody determination.., has been vacated, stayed,
or modified by a court with jurisdiction to do so"; or the "person contesting
the registration" was not given effective notice.409 The court reasoned that
Mr. Kostrzewski's jurisdictional argument did not fit into any of the three
grounds upon which he could contest the judgment.
4 10
Additionally, the court noted that Ms. Frisinger only requested the
registration of the Minnesota judgment, not its enforcement.4 1l This limited
the authority of the trial court's jurisdiction only to the validity of the
Minnesota judgment.41 2 According to the court, the trial court erred when it
determined that the North Dakota courts had jurisdiction to modify the child
custody judgment from Minnesota.
4 13
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the portion of the trial
court's order confirming the registration of the Minnesota child custody
judgment. 414 However, the court held that the trial court exceeded its
authority procedurally and substantively when it determined that it had
jurisdiction pursuant to North Dakota Century Code section 14-14.1-14, and
vacated that portion of the order.
41 5
FAMILY LAW - CHILD SUPPORT- PATERNITY
RYDBERG V. RYDBERG
Diane Rydberg gave birth to a child on March 9, 1992.416 The next
day, Andrew Rydberg acknowledged in writing that he was the child's
father.4 17 On July 22, 1994, Diane and Andrew Rydberg were married and
subsequently separated in April 2002.418 The Ward County Social Service
408. Id. 16, 680 N.W.2d at 274.
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Board (the Board) brought an action for child support against Andrew
Rydberg in May 2002.419 After the Board initiated an action for child
support, Andrew Rydberg claimed that he was not the child's biological
father and requested that the case be dismissed.20 Furthermore, if the
Board did not dismiss the case, Andrew Rydberg indicated he would re-
quest genetic testing to prove that he was not the father of Diane Rydberg's
child.421 On October 18, 2002, in response to Andrew Rydberg's request
for genetic testing, the district court ordered Diane Rydberg, Andrew
Rydberg, and the child to submit to genetic testing.4 22 The DNA testing
confirmed that Andrew Rydberg was not the child's biological father, and
based on the DNA test results, the district court dismissed Diane Rydberg's
action for child support.4 23 The Board made a motion to reconsider the
dismissal, but the district court reiterated that the DNA evidence clearly
indicated Andrew Rydberg was not the child's father.424
The Board maintained that Andrew Rydberg was the presumed father
of the child and had failed to rebut the presumption. 425 The Board subse-
quently made a motion to alter or amend the district court's judgment under
North Dakota Rule of Civil Procedure 59(j). 4 2 6 The Board maintained that
section 14-17-04 of the North Dakota Century Code created a presumption
of paternity for Andrew Rydberg. 427 The Board asserted that genetic testing
alone should not rebut the presumption of paternity and maintained that
419. Id. The court pointed out that for purposes of establishing paternity and securing repay-








426. Id. 6, 678 N.W.2d at 536. In response, Andrew Rydberg argued that the Board's
appeal should be limited to those issues raised in the motion to alter or amend the judgment. Id.
The North Dakota Supreme Court pointed out that the issue of presumption of paternity was raised
in the district court during the hearing for genetic testing, and therefore the issue of presumption
could be raised on appeal. Id. 5T 5-6.
427. Id. TT 7-8 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-04(1) (2004) (repealed 2005)). Editor's
Note: The North Dakota Legislature amended the Uniform Paternity Act provisions in 2005, and
moved entire Act from chapter 14-17 to chapter 14-20. North Dakota Century Code section 14-
17-04(l)(e) provided in part, "A man is presumed to be the biological father of a child if... the
man acknowledges the man's paternity of the child in a writing filed with the division of vital
statistics of the state department of health .... " North Dakota Century Code section 14-17-
04(l)(c)(l) provided, "A man is presumed to be the biological father if... [a]fter a child's birth,
that man and the child's biological mother... marry each other .... " North Dakota Century
Code section 14-17-04(1)(d) provided, "A man is presumed to be the biological father of a child
if... while the child is under the age of majority, the man receives the child into the man's home
and openly holds out the child as the man's biological child."
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paternity could not be rebutted in this case because the applicable statute of
limitations to rebut the presumption of paternity had run. 428
The court rejected the Board's argument that the statute of limitations
precluded Andrew Rydberg from raising nonpaternity as a defense in this
child support action.4 29 In addition, the court noted that the North Dakota
statute of the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) permits an assertion of the
nonexistence of the father-child relationship after five years have passed.430
The court pointed out that North Dakota makes a distinction between
bringing an action and asserting a defense pursuant to section 14-17-
05(1)(b) of the North Dakota Century Code.431 The court looked at other
states that have adopted the UPA and noted that only a few states addressed
the distinction between bringing an action to determine the existence or
nonexistence of the father-child relationship, and asserting the nonexistence
of this relationship as a defense after the five years have passed.4 32
The court reexamined Interest of K.B.433 to determine whether that
ruling "might set up a situation in which no other legal father could be
established because of the statute of limitations for an action to determine a
father-child relationship." 434 The court concluded that where there is a
presumption of paternity, an action to establish a father-child relationship is
not completely barred by a statute of limitations.4 35 The court interpreted
the statute of limitations in North Dakota Century Code section 14-17-05 as
428. See Rydberg, 5 11, 678 N.W.2d at 537 (referring to the statutory time frame for bringing
an action to rebut paternity). North Dakota Century Code section 14-17-05(l)(b) provided that a
party may bring an action "[flor the purpose of declaring the nonexistence of the [presumed]
father and child relationship ... only if the action is brought within a reasonable time after
obtaining knowledge of relevant facts, but in no event later than five years after the child's birth."
429. See Rydberg, 5 12-14, 678 N.W.2d at 537-38 (noting that N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-
05(2) permits an action to determine "the existence or nonexistence of the father and child
relationship" to be brought at any time).
430. Id. 13, 678 N.W.2d at 537 (citing Interest of K.B., 490 N.W.2d 715, 717 (N.D. 1992)).
Under North Dakota Century Code section 14-17-05(l)(b) and Uniform Parentage Act section
6(a)(2), "nonexistence of the father and child relationship can be asserted as a defense after the
five years have passed." Rydberg, 13, 678 N.W.2d at 537.
431. Rydberg, 14, 678 N.W.2d at 537-38.
432. Id. at 538. Alabama does not have a statute of limitations to claim the nonexistence of
paternity; even if a man is presumed to be the father, he can claim the nonexistence of paternity at
any time. Id. (citing J.N.H. v. N.T.H., 705 So. 2d 448, 452 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997)). In contrast,
Missouri courts have held that a defense of nonpaternity is foreclosed by the presumed father. Id.
(citing Mo. Div. of Child Support Enforcement v. T.J., 981 S.W.2d 149, 150 (Mo. 1998)).
Minnesota has interpreted the UPA "to allow a presumed father to challenge the presumption of
paternity in an action brought more than five years after the child's birth." Id. (citing Interest of
K.B., 490 N.W.2d at 717). Like Minnesota, Colorado has established that the right to claim
nonpaternity as a defense is not restricted by a statute of limitations. Id. (citing Interest of R.T.L.,
780 P.2d 508, 514 (Colo. 1989)).
433. 490 N.W.2d 715 (N.D. 1992).
434. Rydberg, 16, 678 N.W.2d at 538.
435. Id. 17.
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a bar only to the bringing of a paternity action. 436 Therefore, the court con-
cluded that Andrew Rydberg was permitted to raise nonpaternity as a
defense to the Board's child support action. 437
The Board contended that genetic tests are inadequate to rebut the
presumption of paternity provided in section 14-17-04(2) of the North
Dakota Century Code.438 In addition, the Board argued that before a pre-
sumption of paternity can be rebutted, section 14-17-04(2) requires an
adjudication of paternity by another man. 439 The court acknowledged that
one UPA state requires a court decree establishing paternity of the child by
another man before a presumption of paternity may be rebutted. 440 How-
ever, the court pointed out that other UPA states have recognized that
genetic test results can provide clear and convincing evidence to rebut the
presumption of paternity 4 !' It was apparent to the court that these states do
not require an adjudication of another man's paternity.442
The court looked at the legislative intent of the North Dakota statute
and determined that the ordinary meaning of the statutory language
permitted a rebuttal of the presumption of paternity by clear and convincing
evidence. 443 Had the legislature intended to limit actions to rebut a pre-
sumption of paternity to only those cases where another man's paternity had
been established, the court reasoned the legislature "would not have
included the clause stating that a presumption of paternity can be rebutted
by clear and convincing evidence." 444
Relying on California case law, the Board argued that other factors
should be considered, and that clear and convincing evidence, such as
genetic test results, would not absolutely rebut the presumption of paternity
436. Id. 1 16-17.
437. Id. T 18, 678 N.W.2d at 538-39.
438. Id. T 19, 678 N.W.2d at 539; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-04(2) (2004) (repealed
2005). This section provided:
A presumption under this section may be rebutted in an appropriate action only by
clear and convincing evidence. If two or more presumptions arise which conflict with
each other, the presumption which on the facts is founded on the weightier consider-
ations of policy and logic controls. The presumption is rebutted by a court decree
establishing paternity of the child by another man.
Id.
439. Rydberg, 5 20, 678 N.W.2d at 539.
440. Id. T 21.
441. See id. T 22 (citing case law from several states which have adopted the UPA and
permitted genetic evidence to rebut the presumption of paternity).
442. Id.
443. Id. T 23.
444. Id.
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in every case. 445 The court pointed out that, in contrast to the present child
support case, the California cases cited by the Board were custody cases
and involved situations where there was a possibility of displacing a child's
relationship with a committed father for a relationship with a potentially
unknown person. 446 The court also noted that section 1.4-17-02 of the North
Dakota Century Code required "an appropriate legal demand of one's
rights, not the appropriate circumstances under which the demand of rights
is asserted." 447  Concluding that the language of section 14-17-02 was
unambiguous, the court rejected the Board's argument that the presumption
may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence only in an appropriate
action, based on a consideration of the surrounding circumstances. 448
The Board also argued that the lower court should have considered the
best interests of the child.449 However, the Board based this argument on
the existence of a competing presumption of paternity and had previously
conceded at oral argument that there was no such competing pre-
sumption. 450 The court concluded that "genetic tests [were] enough to rebut
the presumption of paternity in N.D.C.C. 14-17-04(2)."451
Finally, the Board argued that under section 14-17-08 of the North
Dakota Century Code, the child should have been represented by a guardian
ad litem during the hearing on genetic testing.452 The court acknowledged
that the child in this case was not represented by a parent, and a guardian ad
litem should have been appointed.453 However, the court examined the
record of the hearing and determined that the Board was "clearly
representing the child's [best] interests." 454
445. Id. 1 24, 678 N.W.2d at 540. The Board based its argument on the California court's
requirement of a competing paternity claim in an action to rebut the presumption of paternity. Id.
JJ 25-27. Absent a competing action to establish paternity, the California court was concerned
that a rebuttal of the presumption of paternity would leave the child without a father. Id. 5 25.
446. Id. $ 27.
447. Id. 1 26. The court interpreted a similar statutory reference to mean "that when an
appropriate action [meaning a legal demand of one's rights] has been brought, a presumption can






452. Id. T 30, 678 N.W.2d at 540-41. The statute stated in part, "A child who is a minor must
be represented by the child's parent whose parentage has been established.., or a guardian ad
litem appointed by the court. The court may appoint the director of the county social service
board as guardian ad litem for the child." N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-08 (2004) (repealed 2005).
453. Rydberg, 5 31, 678 N.W.2d at 541.
454. Id. The court concluded that the district court's failure to appoint a guardian ad litem
did not constitute reversible error. Id.
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Based on the circumstances presented in this child support action, a
majority of the court held that the best interests of the child were
represented, and that Andrew Rydberg was not precluded from raising
nonpaternity as a defense based on the results of genetic testing. 455 The
North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal. 456
Justice Kapsner dissented,5 7 and Justice Maring agreed with part III of
Justice Kapsner's dissent.458 In her dissent, Justice Kapsner pointed out that
shortly after the child was born, Andrew Rydberg signed an acknow-
ledgment of paternity.4 59 In addition, Andrew Rydberg married the child's
mother, held himself out to be the child's father for ten years, and accepted
the child into his home.460 Andrew Rydberg's paternity challenge and
subsequent request for genetic testing were motivated by his desire to avoid
child support payments. 461 Justice Kapsner concluded that the statute of
limitations to contest paternity had passed, and that the district court erred
when it permitted Rydberg to bring a paternity action.4 62 In the alternative,
if the statute of limitations did not present an absolute bar to Rydberg's
nonpaternity defense, Justice Kapsner asserted that the child was entitled to
the protections of the UPA, as codified at North Dakota Century Code
chapter 14-17.463 Finally, Justice Kapsner contended that the district court
erred when it ordered the genetic tests and subsequently determined
paternity without considering if equitable estoppel would bar Rydberg from
asserting nonpaternity. 464
455. Id. J 32.
456. Id.
457. Id. 34 (Kapsner, J., dissenting).
458. Id. 53, 678 N.W.2d at 547 (Maring, J., dissenting). Justice Maring contended that
before the district court ruled on the issue of whether the results of genetic testing were
determinative of paternity, it should not only have appointed a guardian ad litem for the child, but
also considered the best interests of the child. Id.
459. Id. 34, 678 N.W.2d at 541 (Kapsner, J., dissenting).
460. Id.
461. Id.
462. Id. The five-year statute of limitations for assertion of nonpatemity provides protection
to a child who has been acknowledged by a father. Id. 39, 678 N.W.2d at 543. Justice Kapsner
contended that the majority position negated this protection and frustrated legislative intent. Id.
463. See id. 34, 678 N.W.2d at 541 (stating that North Dakota law required the
appointment of a guardian ad litem).
464. Id.
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FAMILY LAW-DEPENDENT, NEGLECTED, AND DELINQUENT CHILDREN-
DEPRIVATION, NEGLECT, OR ABUSE
IN THE INTEREST OF T.J.L.
A mother (Linda) and father (Bob) appealed from a judgment ter-
minating parental rights to their daughter (Tracy). 465 At the time of the
termination proceedings, Linda was 31 years old.466 She had been diag-
nosed with "major depression, intermittent explosive disorder, obsessive
compulsive disorder, and borderline personality." 467 At the same time, Bob
was 25 years old.468 He suffered a traumatic brain injury as a child and had
been diagnosed with mental retardation, seizure disorder, and encepha-
lopathy, and functioned at the level of a four- to five-year-old child.469
Both Linda and Bob have histories of violent behavior.
470
When Tracy was born, she went from the hospital directly into foster
care, and Linda and Bob were given visitation rights.47 1 They were referred
to the "Nurturing Program" to learn parenting skills.472 During these
parenting sessions, the couple did not know how to care for Tracy and did
not know what to do when she would start to cry. 4 7 3 Although Tracy had an
upper respiratory condition, Linda and Bob smoked in her presence.4 74 The
smoke created constant respiratory problems for Tracy.
475
The court found that the evidence established that "Social Services
attempted to work with Linda and Bob to improve their homemaking and
parenting skills; [however], the couple avoided offered services and adopted
an adversarial relationship with the service providers."4 76
The court stated that termination of parental rights requires satisfaction
of a three-prong test. 477 First, the child must be a deprived child.478
Second, the conditions and causes of the deprivation must be likely to
465. In the Interest of T.J.L., 2004 ND 142, 1,682 N.W.2d 735, 736.
466. Id. T 5.
467. Id.








476. Id. J 10.
477. Id. 2, 682 N.W.2d at 736.
478. Id.
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continue.479 Third, as a result of the first two prongs, the child is suffering
or will likely suffer serious physical, mental, or emotional harm.4 80 The
party petitioning for termination must prove each factor by clear and
convincing evidence.481
The court held that North Dakota Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)
provides that findings of facts in juvenile matters shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous.4 82 A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if there is
no evidence to support it, if it is clear that a mistake has been made, or if the
finding is made because of an erroneous view of the law.483
The court went on to state that when efforts have been made over an
extensive period of time to overcome a parent's inabilities to effectively
parent, courts cannot allow the child to remain in an intermediate status. 484
The court ultimately held that the district court's findings were not clearly
erroneous.485 The district court was not clearly erroneous in finding that:
(1) there was clear and convincing evidence that Tracy was deprived; (2)
the causes and conditions of her deprivation were likely to continue; and
(3) as a result of the continued deprivation, she would likely suffer serious
physical, mental, or emotional harm if Linda and Bob's parental rights were
not terminated. 4
86
FAMILY LAW-DEPENDENT, NEGLECTED, AND DELINQUENT CHILDREN-
DEPRIVATION, NEGLECT, OR ABUSE
IN THE INTEREST OF T.T.
A mother appealed a juvenile court ruling that her ten-year-old child
was deprived. 487 The juvenile court placed legal custody of the child with
the Department of Human Services and physical custody with the
mother.488 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the juvenile court's
decision, holding that the court's finding that there was clear and convinc-






484. Id. T 11, 682 N.W.2d at 738.
485. Id.
486. Id.
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The State had filed a petition alleging that this child was deprived, with
which the juvenile court agreed.4 90 The court ordered the child to be
"placed in the care, custody, and control of the Department of Human Ser-
vices," allowing "the child to remain with his mother unless the Department
deemed that it was necessary to remove the child from the mother's
home." 49 1
On appeal, the mother first argued "that errors of law during [the]
proceeding affected the outcome of the case," and secondly, that the
proceeding affected "her and the child's constitutional rights." 492 The court
took each argument in turn. 493
First, the mother argued that the time lapse between the filing of the
deprivation petition and the date of the hearing violated the thirty-day
requirement of North Dakota Century Code section 27-20-22.494 The court
found that because the record did not show the mother had previously
raised this issue in the juvenile court, she could not raise it for the first time
on appeal.495 The court noted that even if the mother had previously raised
the issue, the delay was caused in part by demands for a change of judge by
the mother and the father.496 Therefore, the court concluded that the
juvenile court had good cause for the delay. 497
Next, the mother argued that the "juvenile court erred by allowing
issues from a divorce-related custody proceeding to be mixed with issues
about deprivation." 498 However, there were no citations to the record
establishing the mixture of divorce issues and deprivation issues.499
According to the court, the record demonstrated that the custody and
deprivation proceedings were conducted separately. 500 The court also
rejected the mother's argument that the district court erred in admitting a
memorandum decision in the divorce proceeding into evidence, and her
claim that the father improperly participated in the deprivation proceeding
as a de facto co-counsel for the State.501 The court explained that the
mother could not complain about this issue on appeal because she "agreed
490. Id. 5T 2-3, 681 N.W.2d at 781.
491. Id. 5 3.
492. Id. J 6.
493. Id. 55J 7-26, 681 N.W.2d at 781-86.
494. Id. T 7, 681 N.W.2d at 781-82.
495. Id. 5 8, 681 N.W.2d at 782.
496. Id.
497. Id.
498. Id. 5 9.
499. Id. 5 11.
500. Id.
501. Id. 5T 12-13, 681 N.W.2d at 783.
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to the procedure for allowing the father to call a witness during the State's
case-in-chief."502 The court ultimately determined that there was no evi-
dence "to support the mother's claim that the juvenile court improperly
mixed" divorce and deprivation proceedings.
503
The mother also argued that the juvenile court erred when it admitted
the testimony of the former guardian ad litem and when it "denied her
constitutional right to custody and companionship of her child."504 Again,
the court held that because the mother did not raise either issue at the
juvenile court, she would not be allowed to raise them on appeal for the first
time.505 Additionally, the court stated that the mother's constitutional
claims were meritless.
506
The mother also argued that the juvenile court erred when it admitted
testimony by a doctor regarding parental alienation syndrome, because the
syndrome is not a recognized scientific term and does not apply when there
is domestic violence.507 Again, the court found that in the juvenile court
proceedings, the mother did not object to the testimony on the basis that the
term was not recognized in the scientific community, and therefore could
not raise the issue for the first time on appeal.508
Next, the mother argued that "she should have been allowed to cross-
examine adverse witnesses." 509 The court found that the mother made con-
clusory assertions without citation to any relevant authorities, and thus the
mother's argument on this issue was without merit.
510
The mother argued error by the juvenile court in refusing to admit "into
evidence records of the supervised exchange center ... involved with
supervising custodial exchanges between the mother and the father."511 The
court stated that a lower court decision to admit or exclude evidence on the
grounds of relevance will not be reversed unless the court abused its
discretion, and concluded that the juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion. 512
502. Id.
503. Id. 5 14.
504. Id. 15-16.
505. Id. at 783-84.
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Finally, the mother argued that the State failed to prove deprivation by
clear and convincing evidence.5 13 She also claimed that the juvenile court
failed to identify the facts upon which it rested its ultimate conclusion. 514
The court found that the juvenile court's findings "adequately explained the
basis" for its ruling.515 The court concluded that the juvenile court's finding
of clear and convincing evidence was not clearly erroneous, and affirmed
the juvenile court orders.5 16
FAMILY LAW-DIVORCE-ALIMONY, ALLOWANCES, AND DISPOSITION OF
PROPERTY
HILGERS V. HILGERS
In Hilgers v. Hilgers,5 17 Douglas Hilgers appealed the district court's
letter opinion that denied his motion to reconsider, amend, or set aside
previous court orders relative to obligations of child and spousal support
due to his divorce from Brenda Hilgers.518 The North Dakota Supreme
Court noted that Douglas had appealed a "nonappealable order," but
concluded that its review was appropriate under the circumstances of the
case. 519 While the court found that the district court had not abused its
discretion regarding its refusal to reconsider Douglas's request to be re-
lieved from the order granting spousal support to Brenda, the court did find
that the district court abused its discretion when it refused to address the
child and spousal support issues which he raised.5 20 The court dismissed
his appeal and directed the district court to handle the child and spousal
support issues raised in his motions. 521
Douglas and Brenda Hilgers were married in 1980.522 In September
1998, Brenda was granted a divorce from Douglas.523 Four children were
born over the course of their marriage, with two children still being of




516. Id. 25-26, 630 N.W.2d at 785-86.
517. 2004 ND 95, 679 N.W.2d 447.
518. Hilgers, 5 1,679 N.W.2d at 448-49.
519. Id. at 449.
520. Id.
521. Id.
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custody of the minor children to Brenda and ordered Douglas to pay child
and spousal support.5 25
Douglas thereafter filed a number of motions with the district court.526
Most notably, on March 28, 2003, Douglas filed a motion for a temporary
change of custody of his minor son. 527 On May 13, 2003, the district court
granted Douglas custody of his minor son, discontinued his child support
obligation to Brenda, and ordered her to pay child support.528 The court
also added a letter with the order that the amount of child support could be
increased depending on any future increase in Brenda's income.529
Subsequent to the change of custody, Douglas filed numerous motions
regarding the termination of his spousal support obligations, requests for
Brenda to pay him spousal support, and the failure of Brenda to pay any
child support since the change of custody of their minor son. 530 Included in
these motions was a motion dated July 7, 2003, that requested the court to
amend or set aside the "Orders of the Court."531 During this time, Brenda
relocated to Bottineau County.532 The Ward County District Court ordered
that a certified copy of the child and spousal support order be filed with the
Bottineau County Clerk of Court, and any inquiries the parties had should
be directed there.533 Because Douglas had not had any response to his
motions, he sent a letter dated July 14, 2003, to the Ward County District
Court inquiring into whether his motions were being reviewed, and also to
determine if he could request a change of venue.534 On August 21, 2003,
the district court issued Douglas a letter stating that the case was still
venued in Ward County, but it did not address the child or spousal support
issues he had raised in his motions. 535
On September 2, 2003, Douglas filed an appeal regarding the denial of
reconsideration of the spousal support orders. 536 Through a lengthy dis-
cussion, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that, pursuant to North
Dakota Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1), Douglas had only timely




528. Id. at 450.
529. Id.
530. Id. 5T 5-10, 679 N.W.2d at 450-51.
531. Id. 5 8,679 N.W.2d at 450.
532. Id. 7.
533. Id.
534. Id. 9, 679 N.W.2d at 451.
535. Id.
536. Id. T5 9-11.
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motion to set aside or amend the previous orders of the court.5 37 The court
noted that, unless an order or judgment is entered after the opinion letter is
issued, an opinion letter is not appealable under North Dakota Century
Code section 28-27-02.538 However, the court decided to 'nvoke its super-
visory authority because the district court's failure to consider any of
Douglas's motions regarding child and spousal support left him with no
alternate remedy. 53
9
A decision by a district court to deny a motion to alter, amend, or
reconsider an order or judgment will not be overturned unless the district
court abuses its discretion.540 In his appellate brief, Douglas asserted that
the district court erred in five of its determinations. 54 1 First, he argued that
the district court erred in not granting him relief from the spousal order
contained in the divorce judgment.5 42 Douglas again relied on his health
problems during the default divorce proceedings as the justification for
relief.543 The North Dakota Supreme Court found that because he did not
introduce any new evidence or arguments, the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it did not reconsider the motion.544
Douglas also asserted that the district court erred when it did not order
Brenda to pay spousal support or establish a trust fund for their minor
son.545 The North Dakota Supreme Court found that, because the district
court did not initially award Douglas spousal support and did not reserve its
jurisdiction, the district court lacked the jurisdictional authority to award
him spousal support.546 Additionally, the court concluded that because
Douglas did not raise the trust fund issue at the district court level, he could
not do so on appeal. 547
Douglas also asserted that the district court erred when it did not
consider his motions regarding Brenda's child support responsibility and
arrearages, and modification of his spousal support obligations. 548 The
North Dakota Supreme Court agreed.549 The court reasoned that a court
537. Id. T 12-13.
538. Id. 5 15, 679 N.W.2d at 452.
539. Id. T5 16-17, 679 N.W.2d at 452-53.










NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
errs when it fails to determine an obligor's child support amount in
accordance with the Child Support Guidelines. 550 The court also noted that
spousal support may be modified when a material change of circumstances
is proven. 551 Because Douglas requested that Brenda's child support
amount be determined, and also asserted that his financial circumstances
changed, which would satisfy a change in circumstances and therefore
justify modification of spousal support, the issues raised were not
frivolous.552 The court stated that it is an abuse of discretion if a district
court does not address non-frivolous issues raised. 553 The North Dakota
Supreme Court held that, because the district court did not address Brenda's
child support obligation and modification of Douglas's spousal support
amount, the district court abused its discretion. 554 The North Dakota
Supreme Court dismissed Douglas's appeal and directed the district court to
handle the child and spousal support issues raised in his motions. 555
FAMILY LAW - DIVORCE- PROPERTY DIVISION
STRIEFEL V. STRIEFEL
In Striefel v. Striefel,556 Edward Striefel appealed the trial court's
finding that his California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS)
payments were marital property that could be divided, and that Ann Striefel
was entitled to spousal support as a disadvantaged spouse. 557 Ann cross-
appealed, alleging the award of only one fourth of Edward's CalPERS
payments was clearly erroneous. 558 The North Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed the award of spousal support, and reversed and remanded in part
regarding the CalPERS award. 559
Edward and Ann Striefel were married in 1986 and had two children
throughout their marriage. 560 Edward worked for the California Depart-
ment of Corrections from 1987 until he started having problems with hip
disease in 1992.561 In 1993, Edward was placed on disability status and had
550. Id. T 23, 679 N.W.2d at 453-54.
551. Id. at 454.
552. Id. at 453.
553. Id. J 25.
554. Id.
555. Id. 26.
556. 2004 ND 210,689 N.W.2d 415.
557. Striefel, 5 6, 689 N.W.2d at 418.
558. Id.
559. Id. 1,689 N.W.2d at 417.
560. Id. 2. Edward had prior surgery for the condition in 1982. Id.
561. Id.
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been approved for CaIPERS disability benefits. 562 The Striefels moved to
North Dakota where Edward continued his college education, which was
paid for by California workers' compensation funds under a rehabilitation
program. 563 After Edward completed school in 1994, he started drawing
from his CalPERS benefits, and Ann began working outside of the home.564
Ann sued for divorce in December 2002 while she was an assistant manager
of McDonalds earning $22,254 per year, and Edward was working in the
school system for $14,000 per year.565
The trial court determined that including Edward's benefits and salary,
his income was twice that of Ann's, meaning it would be easier for him to
make ends meet. 566 The trial court also included the CalPERS payments as
marital property and determined that the payments were part of an early
retirement program; as a result, Ann was entitled to one fourth of Edward's
future CalPERS benefits.567 The trial court further concluded that Ann was
a disadvantaged spouse but capable of rehabilitation, and the court awarded
her spousal support for the next four years.568
The North Dakota Supreme Court began its analysis of the issue by
stating that if the CalPERS payments were disability benefits, they would
not be included in marital property, but if the benefits were part of a
pension or retirement, then the payments could be included.569 The court
looked to California law to determine the proper treatment of CalPERS
benefits. 570 According to California case law, a determination of the
predominant purpose of the benefit is necessary to find the primary
objective of that benefit. 571 The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that
although California and North Dakota both treat retirement benefits as
marital property and disability payments as non-marital property, after
retirement age, disability benefits are considered part of marital property.572
Because of this distinction, the court looked at the time the disability
payments were being made to determine the predominant function of the
benefit.573 In Edward's case, the court determined that the trial court erred
562. Id.
563. Id.
564. Id. $J 2-3.
565. Id. J 3.
566. Id. 4.
567. Id. at 417-18.
568. Id. T 5, 689 N.W.2d at 418.
569. Id. 12, 689 N.W.2d at 420.
570. Id. 11,689 N.W.2d at 419-20.
571. Id. at 419 (citing In re Marriage of Stenquist, 582 P.2d 96, 103 (Cal. 1978)).
572. Id. 5 12, 689 N.W.2d at 420.
573. Id.
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when it deemed his benefits as retirement benefits, and further stated that
the benefits were disability benefits as they were being paid to cover his
disability.5 74 However, the court noted that when Edward was eligible for
retirement, the benefits would be considered retirement benefits and part of
marital property. 575 The court reversed the trial court's decision and re-
manded the case in order to obtain an equitable property division based
upon the findings on that issue. 57
6
Next, the court analyzed the award of spousal support. 577 The court
stated that if a spouse forgoes opportunities as a consequence of a marriage,
and if the spouse contributed to the supporting spouse's increased earning
capacity while they were married, the spouse has been disadvantaged.
578
The court determined that since Ann supported Edward while he went back
to school, cared for their home and children, contributed to Edward's
earning capacity, and lost work opportunities, advantages, and the right to
retirement benefits, she should be entitled to rehabilitative support.
579
However, even though the determination of rehabilitative spousal support
was affirmed, the court noted that the amount might change on remand
based upon reconsideration of property division.5 80 Finally, the court took a
brief look at Ann's cross-appeal. 581 The court stated that the issue need not
be addressed, as the benefits had been determined to belong only to Edward
and were not part of the marital property.
5 82
FAMILY LAW - DIVORCE- SPOUSAL SUPPORT
MEYER V. MEYER
In Meyer v. Meyer,583 Diane Meyer appealed a district court judgment
"modifying Timothy Meyer's spousal support obligation from $800 per
month to $300 per month." 584 The North Dakota Supreme Court held that
the trial court could properly consider the husband's reduction in income in
determining whether there had been a material change in circumstances
574. Id. 14, 689 N.W.2d at 421.
575. Id.
576. Id. T 15.
577. Id. 16.
578. Id. (citing Amsbaugh v. Amsbaugh, 2004 ND 11, 5 40, 673 N.W.2d 601, 611).
579. Id. 5 17, 689 N.W.2d at 421-22.
580. Id.
581. Id. 5 18, 689 N.W.2d at 422.
582. Id. 5 19.
583. 2004 ND 89, 679 N.W.2d 273.
584. Meyer, 1, 679 N.W.2d at 274-75.
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warranting modification of spousal support.585 The court also determined
that the trial court did not fail to give adequate consideration to the fact that
the parties stipulated to the original spousal support award. 586 The North
Dakota Supreme Court reversed the trial court's modification because it
failed to explain the reasons for the reduction from $800 to $300 per
month. 587
Timothy and Diane Meyer were officially divorced in February
1998.588 Under the original stipulated divorce decree, Timothy was re-
quired to pay $800 per month to Diane for ten years.589 In 1998, Timothy
earned $72,000 per year, while Diane was making only $22,000 per year.590
Five years later, Timothy's employer was sold, and his income was reduced
from $79,000 to $50,000 per year.591 Based on this reduction, Timothy
moved for "termination of his spousal support obligation, or in the
alternative, a reduction in the amount of support." 592 In a hearing before a
judicial referee, the referee recommended that the support obligation be
reduced to $300 per month for the remaining term of the agreement. 593
Diane requested a review by the district court, which affirmed the referee's
findings. 594 Diane appealed the district court's decision.595
Upon review, Diane asserted several arguments. 596 First, she argued
that the court's modification of spousal support was clearly erroneous
because Timothy's loss of income did not constitute a material change in
circumstances. 597 The North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed, finding a
material change in circumstances because the 30.6% reduction in Timothy's
income constituted a major decrease. 598 The court noted that at the time of
585. Id. 7, 679 N.W.2d at 276.
586. Id. 8.
587. Id. 9.










598. Id. 7, 679 N.W.2d at 276. The court stated that "[a] material change in circumstances
means something that substantially affects the parties' financial abilities or needs, and the reasons
for changes in income must be examined as well as the extent to which the changes were
contemplated by the parties at the time of the initial decree." Id. T 5, 679 N.W.2d at 275 (citing
Schmalle v. Schmalle, 1998 ND 201, 12, 586 N.W.2d 677, 681). Furthermore, "[a]
contemplated change is one taken into consideration by the district court in fashioning its original
decree." Id.
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the original decree, the difference between Timothy's and Diane's incomes
was $50,000, while the current difference was only $18,000.599
Second, Diane asserted that the reduction in Timothy's income was
both contemplated and voluntary, and therefore his reduction in salary
should not be considered in finding a material change in circumstances. 600
The court found that while the parties contemplated that Timothy might
voluntarily change jobs, thus reducing his income, neither party
contemplated that Timothy's income would be reduced involuntarily as the
result of the sale of his employer.60' The court stated:
More importantly, the parties did not contemplate the extent to
which Timothy Meyer's income has ultimately been reduced by
the sale of his employer. The change was not voluntarily incurred
by Timothy Meyer, nor was it contemplated by the parties or
considered by the district court in fashioning the original decree.602
Thus, the court held that the trial court did not err in considering Timothy's
reduction in income as relevant to its finding that a material change in
circumstances existed. 603
Finally, Diane asserted that the trial court did not adequately consider
that the original decree was based upon the stipulation of the parties, and
therefore should not be changed.604 The court noted that although spousal
support decrees based on stipulation of the parties are favored and should
be changed only "with great reluctance," such a decree can be modified
upon a showing of a material change in circumstances. 605 The court
rejected Diane's argument because there was no evidence that the trial court
failed to adequately consider the parties' original stipulated decree. 606 The
trial court properly considered the reduction in income and determined that
a material change in circumstances existed. 607 Therefore, the court held that
the trial court's finding was not clearly erroneous. 608
Even though it rejected all of Diane's arguments, the North Dakota
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order modifying the spousal
599. Id. T 6, 679 N.W.2d at 275-76. In 1998, Timothy's income was $72,000 and Diane's
income was $22,000. Id. However, following the divorce Diane's income had increased to
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support payments because the modification was not properly explained in
relation to the reduction in income.60 9 The trial court did not provide suf-
ficient analysis on Diane's current need for the support, nor on Timothy's
current ability to pay spousal support.610 Instead, it only concluded that
Diane's needs had changed and so had Timothy's ability to pay. 61' Thus,
the court could not determine why the support payments were reduced from
$800 to $300 per month. 612
On remand the trial court was ordered to evaluate Timothy's ability to
pay and Diane's need for the support, and to award an amount that was
"adequately proportional to the reduction in Timothy Meyer's income in
light of Diane Meyer's need for support." 613 Finally, the court ordered the
trial court to give "sufficient credence" to the fact that the original decree
was based upon the stipulation of the parties. 614
Justice Maring dissented in part and concurred in part. 615 Justice
Maring agreed that the order of the trial court must be reversed; however,
she disagreed with the majority's reasoning. 616 Justice Maring found no
material change in circumstances because "the alleged change of
circumstances was contemplated by the parties when they entered into the
agreement to settle their spousal support and property division issues and
because there is no evidence Timothy Meyer's ability to earn is im-
paired ... ."617 Furthermore, Justice Maring noted that even if Timothy's
reduction in income was a change in circumstances, the trial court provided
no analysis of whether the change was material because there was no
evidence of whether Timothy was able to make the payments. 618 Finally,
even if the change were material, Justice Maring would have reversed
because the trial court provided no analysis explaining why $300 per month
was the appropriate modification of the spousal support payments. 619
Justice Sandstrom also dissented because he argued that the trial
court's order modifying the support payments from $800 to $300 per month
should stand.620 Justice Sandstrom noted that the difference in income
609. Id. 1 9 (citing Wheeler v. Wheeler, 548 N.W.2d 27, 30 (N.D. 1996)).





615. Id. 12 (Maring, J., dissenting).
616. Id.
617. Id. 20, 679 N.W.2d at 279.
618. Id. 15 21-23, 679 N.W.2d at 279-80.
619. Id. T 24, 679 N.W.2d at 280.
620. Id. 5T 28-29, 679 N.W.2d at 280-81 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
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between the two parties had narrowed by 64% according to the record. 621
He then noted that the trial court reduced the monthly payment by 62.5%.622
Believing that the judgment should have been affirmed, Justice Sandstrom
concluded, "The math speaks for itself."623
FAMILY LAW- INFANTS- DEPENDENT, NEGLECTED, AND DELINQUENT
CHILDREN
IN RE T.F. AND T.F.
In In re T.F. and T.F.,624 J.F. ("John") appealed the termination of "his
parental rights to his six-year-old son, T.C.F. ("Ted"), and his four-year-old
daughter, T.M.F. ("Tina")."625 The North Dakota Supreme Court held that
there was clear and convincing evidence justifying the termination of
John's parental rights.626 The court further concluded that there was evi-
dence beyond a reasonable doubt that the children would likely suffer
serious emotional or physical harm if they stayed in John's care.627
In January 2001, Traill County Social Services took Ted and Tina into
protective custody due to alleged physical abuse by John towards Ted.628 In
May 2001, John pled guilty to charges of aggravated assault involving a
ten-year-old girl, although John disputed the charges.629 On February 26,
2002, John retained physical custody of the children.630 Traill County
Social Services required John to secure ongoing employment and to quit
using drugs and alcohol.631 However, John continued to use marijuana and
was charged with a DUI after the children were returned to his care. 632
Because of this, John's probation was revoked, and he returned to jail.633
Ted and Tina were once again removed from John's custody due to his
incarceration and placed in the care of an aunt, who then planned to adopt
the children upon the termination of their mother and father's parental
rights. 634 After the hearing on June 9, 2003, the juvenile court granted the
621. Id. T 30, 679 N.W.2d at 281.
622. Id.
623. Id.
624. 2004 ND 126, 681 N.W.2d 786.
625. In re T.F. and T.F., 5 1, 681 N.W.2d at 788.
626. Id.
627. Id.
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petition to terminate John's parental rights, finding that the children were in
fact deprived, that deprivation was likely to continue, and that the children
would "suffer serious physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm" if John's
rights were not terminated.635
John appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court, arguing a lack of
clear and convincing evidence of past and continuing deprivation.
636
Additionally, John argued that there was insufficient evidence to determine
beyond a reasonable doubt that the children would suffer harm if his rights
were not terminated. 637 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if
the child is deprived, if the deprivation is likely to continue, and if the child
is suffering or is likely to suffer in the future. 638 Additionally, the children
were members of an Indian tribe, and therefore the elements of the Indian
Child Welfare Act (ICWA) also needed to be satisfied.639 ICWA provides
that in order for parental rights to be terminated, it must be shown by
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the child would suffer "serious
emotional or physical damage" if he or she remained in the custody of the
parent whose rights are to be terminated.640 Additionally, ICWA further
requires that efforts must be made to keep the family together, and that
those efforts must not have been successful.641
Rule 52(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure was amended
to provide that the findings of fact in a juvenile court proceeding will not be
overturned unless they are clearly erroneous. 642 However, it is within the
court's authority to determine when a rule is in effect if it does not affect a
substantive right.643 The court noted that John did not appeal to the district
court because he believed the North Dakota Supreme Court would review
his case de novo.644 The court concluded that in the interest of fairness and
justice, it would apply the pre-amendment standard of review, akin to de
novo review. 645
In reviewing the record, the court first looked to whether the children
were deprived. 646 The court reasoned that at the time of the termination
635. Id. J 5, 681 N.W.2d at 788-89.
636. Id. J 6, 681 N.W.2d at 789.
637. Id.
638. Id. J 7 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-44(1)(b) (Supp. 2003)).
639. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (2000)).
640. Id.




645. Id. at 790.
646. Id. T 10.
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hearing, Ted and Tina's parents were unable to provide for their care. 647
The mother had no contact with the children, and John voluntarily violated
his probation, ultimately leading to his re-incarceration. 648
Regarding continued deprivation, the court looked to the testimony of a
practicing psychologist who testified that the continued absence of Ted's
parents would lead to serious emotional harm. 649 Additionally, a social
worker testified that Tina had been placed in at least five different homes in
just four-and-a-half years. 650 The court also took into account the fact that
John himself contributed to the instability of his children's lives by vio-
lating his probation and not providing a stable, safe home environment for
the children. 651
When considering the additional requirements as set forth in the Indian
Child Welfare Act, the court looked to John's past conduct and his potential
inability to refrain from such conduct in the future. 652 Additionally, the
court looked to the assistance that was provided by Traill County Social
Services to help keep John with his children. 653 The court noted that while
John tried to comply with the requirements, he continued to use drugs and
alcohol, which led to his incarceration and inability to care for his
children.654
After reviewing the record, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed
the juvenile court's order and held that there was clear and convincing
evidence that the children were deprived, that the deprivation was likely to
continue, and because of this continued deprivation the children were likely
to suffer serious harm if John's parental rights were not terminated. 655
Additionally, the court also held that there was evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that if the children stayed in John's care, they would likely
suffer serious emotional or physical harm.656
Justice Sandstrom and Justice Neumann concurred, with Justice
Sandstrom concurring specially. 657 Justice Sandstrom agreed with the
majority that John's parental rights should be terminated, but disagreed with
the application of pre-amendment North Dakota Rule of Civil Procedure
647. Id. 11.
648. Id.
649. Id.j 13,681 N.W.2d at 791.
650. Id. 14.
651. Id. 16.
652. Id. 5 22, 681 N.W.2d at 792.
653. Id.
654. Id.
655. Id. 24, 681 NW.2d at 793.
656. Id.
657. Id. 25 (Sandstrom, J., concurring).
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52(a).658 Justice Sandstrom reasoned that because the application of the
clearly erroneous standard in the amended version would not have worked
an injustice, it should have been applied in its amended form.6 59
HEALTH LAW-GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE-RECOVERY BACK OR
RECOUPMENT OF PAYMENTS
IN RE ESTATE OF BERGMAN
The North Dakota Department of Human Services (the Department)
appealed the dismissal of its claim against Lucille Bergman's estate for
Medicaid benefits provided to her late husband, Carl Bergman. 6 0 The
district court also dismissed the estate's action to void transfers made by
Lucille to two of her sons shortly before her death. 661 The North Dakota
Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment, dismissed the
Department's claims, and remanded the case because the trial court
incorrectly applied Medicaid law and prior court precedent. 662
In 1993, "Carl Bergman purchased a $50,000 single payment annuity
from Lutheran Brotherhood," and in 1995 transferred "$5,000 from the
annuity to a joint money market account" for Carl and Lucille Bergman. 663
In 1996, Carl moved to a nursing home and applied for Medicaid
benefits.664 To qualify under the impoverished spouse rules, Carl trans-
ferred all annuity and money market funds to Lucille, who used them to
open a money market account in her own name. 665 In 1998, Lucille trans-
ferred $40,000 to an investment account and left about $13,790.24 in her
money market account.666
In 2002, Lucille Bergman was diagnosed with cancer.667 At that time,
her attorney informed her that her estate might be responsible for Carl
Bergman's Medicaid benefits. 668 In November 2002, Lucille withdrew
$10,000 from her money market account for funeral expenses, redeemed the
shares in her investment account, and transferred those funds to her money
658. Id.
659. Id.
660. In re Estate of Bergman, 2004 ND 196, 1, 688 N.W.2d 187, 188.
661. Id.
662. Id. 13, 688 N.W.2d at 192.
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market account.669 On December 6, 2002, Lucille withdrew $34,000 from
her money market account for deposit in her checking account.670 She also
executed a power of attorney granting Robert Bergman control over the
funds.671 On December 9, 2002, Lucille wrote a $30,000 check to Robert
for gifts for her four children and "a $2,800 check to Doug Bergman for
gifts to her four children and grandchildren." 672 On December 28, 2003,
Lucille Bergman died.673
Lucille Bergman's estate wanted to void the transfers to Robert and
Doug Bergman.674 The Department was granted a motion to intervene in
the estate's action against Robert and Doug Bergman to recover Carl
Bergman's Medicaid costs. 675 The district court thereafter dismissed the
estate's action and the Department's claim against the estate.676
The district court determined that there was no property in Lucille
Bergman's estate, holding that Carl Bergman had transferred the annuity to
Lucille Bergman long before his death and had no interest in the annuity at
the time of his death. 677 In addition, the district court dismissed the
Department's claim against Lucille's estate. 678 Relying on In re Estate of
Wirtz,6 79 the district court held that the annuity funds were Lucille
Bergman's separate property, and she could freely decide how to allocate
those funds. 680 Based on both the North Dakota definition of the estate
subject to probate and the legal transfer permitted by federal law, the
district court found that the funds were not fraudulently transferred and
therefore were not available to reimburse the Department for the Medicaid
claim.681
However, in its appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, the
Department argued that the district court erred in its application of North
Dakota and federal Medicaid law.682 The Department asserted that
669. Id. at 188-89.









679. 2000 ND 59, 607 N.W.2d 882. The court in Wirtz interpreted state and federal
Medicaid statutes to limit the state's ability to recover benefits from the surviving spouse's estate.
Wirtz, 5 7, 607 N.W.2d at 884.
680. Bergman, T 4, 688 N.W.2d at 190.
681. Id.
682. Id. $ 5.
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Lucille's assets were traceable to Carl, and that the transfer of those assets
represented fraud. 683 The Department maintained that In re Estate of
Thompson684 and Wirtz allowed it to trace the assets of Medicaid
recipients. 685
In Thompson, the court determined that federal and state Medicaid
statutes allowed the state to trace assets of a Medicaid recipient and to
recover those Medicaid benefits after the death of the recipient's surviving
spouse.686 In addition, the Department may seek to recover Medicaid
benefits from the estate of the recipient after the death of the recipient's
spouse or directly from the recipient spouse's estate. 687
In Wirtz, the court again construed the state and federal Medicaid
statutes to allow the state "to trace a recipient's assets and to recover money
from the estate of a recipient's surviving spouse . ."688 However, the
court noted that the recoverable assets were limited to only those assets in
which the decedent originally held an interest.689 The court also pointed out
that the federal Medicaid statute does not permit recovery from the
separately owned assets in the surviving spouse's estate. 690
Before her death, Lucille was aware of a possible claim by the
Department, and she transferred the assets in this dispute to her children. 691
The court concluded that North Dakota probate statutes permit the
decedent's creditors to recover assets transferred to avoid recovery. 692
Moreover, North Dakota's Medicaid law permits recovery from the medical
assistance recipient's estate. 693 The court also noted that the transfer of
assets without the receipt of reasonably equivalent value in exchange is
constructive fraud. 694
The court rejected the lower court's determination that assets
transferred from Carl Bergman to Lucille Bergman were her separate
property.695 The court concluded that such a transfer would frustrate the
683. Id.
684. 1998 ND 226, 586 N.W.2d 847.
685. Bergman, T 5, 688 N.W.2d at 190.
686. See id. T 6 (noting that N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-24.1-07 (1999); and 42 U.S.C. §
1396p(b) (2000); permit recovery of Medicaid benefits).
687. Id.
688. Id. 5 7 (citing In re Estate of Wirtz, 2000 ND 59, T 14, 607 N.W.2d 882, 886).
689. Id.
690. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)).
691. Id. $10.
692. Id.5 11.
693. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-24.1-07).
694. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 13-02.1-05(1) (2004)).
695. Id. at 191.
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purpose of the Medicaid impoverished spouse provision. 696 The court
explained that if the institutionalized spouse were allowed to transfer assets,
the Department would be unable to recoup any of the Medicaid benefits
provided to the institutionalized spouse.697
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE-WRONGFUL DEATH
LONG V. JASZCZAK
In Long v. Jaszczak,698 David Long appealed the trial court's summary
judgment dismissal of a wrongful death claim based on the death of his wife
caused by complications of a medical procedure performed at Mercy Medi-
cal Center. 699 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of
the claim against Dr. Jaszczak because it was barred by the statute of
limitations and because the hospital did not owe Jane Long a legal duty of
care. 700 However, the court reversed and remanded the claim against Dr.
Adducci because he failed to obtain consent from Jane Long for the pro-
cedure. 701 The court concluded that the issues of materiality of risk and
causation for failure to obtain consent were to be decided by the trier of
fact.702
On July 6, 1999, Joseph E. Adducci treated Jane Long for a recurring
urinary tract infection.703 Dr. Adducci ordered an intravenous pyelogram
(IVP) that was performed at Mercy Medical Center on July 9.704 Dr.
Jaszczak was the supervising radiologist. 705 Jane Long had an allergic
reaction to the IVP, went into anaphylactic shock, and died on July 24,
1999, while in a coma.70 6 Jane's husband, David Long, sued Dr. Adducci,
Dr. Jaszczak, and Mercy Medical Center for failing to obtain informed
consent from Jane for the IVP.707 David argued that Mercy Medical
Center's informed consent policy was either negligent or negligently
administered in Jane's case. 708 The district court dismissed all claims
696. Id.
697. Id. 5 12, 688 N.W.2d at 192.
698. 2004 ND 194, 688 N.W.2d 173.
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because David Long failed to timely disclose an expert to testify as to
hospital administrative procedures and because he failed to establish a
causal link between the failure to disclose risks and Jane's death.709
The North Dakota Supreme Court dismissed the claim against Dr.
Jaszczak because the statute of limitations had run. 710 Under North Dakota
Century Code section 28-01-18(3), recovery for damages resulting from
medical malpractice is banned after two years. 71' When death results, the
limitation period begins to run when "the plaintiff knows, or with rea-
sonable diligence should know, of (1) the injury, (2) its cause, and (3) the
defendant's possible negligence." 712 The court held that David Long had
facts sufficient to place a reasonable person on notice of a potential
malpractice claim when Jane Long fell into anaphylactic shock.713 Thus, by
the time David Long served his complaint on Dr. Jaszczak, the two-year
period had run. 714 However, the statute of limitations issue was not
sufficient to dismiss the case against Dr. Adducci because David Long was
able to serve Dr. Adducci within the two-year time limit.71 5
The court then addressed the issue of whether Dr. Adducci was
required to give informed consent to Jane Long before administering the
IVP.716 Informed consent is a disclosure given by the doctor in which a
patient receives sufficient information "to make an informed and intelligent
decision on whether to submit to a proposed course of treatment or surgical
procedure." 717 Dr. Adducci argued that David Long failed to establish that
709. Id. 4.
710. Id. 110, 688 N.W.2d at 176.
711. Id. 9.
712. Id. (citing Schanilec v. Grand Forks Clinic, Ltd., 1999 ND 165, 5 12, 599 N.W.2d 253,
255-56).
713. Id. 5 10.
714. Id. at 176-77. The date Jane Long went into shock was July 9, 1999, and thus the
statute of limitations began to run on July 10, 1999. Id. at 176. The sheriff's return, which
certified that the summons and complaint were delivered to the sheriff, was dated July 13, 2001,
just outside the two-year period. Id.
715. Id. 11, 688 N.W.2d at 177. The summons and complaint were delivered to the sheriff
on July 9, 2001, and the court had previously held that delivery to the sheriff "with the intent to
promptly serve the defendant" is enough to satisfy North Dakota Century Code section 28-01-18.
Id. Therefore, David Long met the requirements to comply with the statute of limitations for the
claim against Dr. Adducci. Id.
716. Id. 5 12.
717. Id. T 15,688 N.W.2d at 178. The court described this duty:
It clearly is not necessary for every physician or health care provider who becomes
involved with a patient to obtain informed consent for every medical procedure to
which the patient submits. Rather, it is the responsibility of a physician to obtain
informed consent for those procedures and treatments that the physician formally
prescribes or performs.
Id. (quoting Koapke v. Herfendal, 2003 ND 64, 18, 660 N.W.2d 206, 212).
[VOL. 81:585
NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
death was a material risk of the IVP procedure, and since the risk of death
was so remote, knowledge of the risk would not affect a reasonable
patient's decision whether to undergo the surgery.718 To determine whether
a risk is material, the court analyzes two factors: "(1) an examination of the
existence and nature of the risk and the probability of its occurrence; and
(2) a determination by the trier of fact of whether the risk is the type of
harm which a reasonable patient would consider in deciding on medical
treatment."719 The court found that the evidence indisputably showed that
only 1 in 40,000 to 1 in 150,000 patients receiving an IVP would later die
from it.720 The court then found that whether this was the type of risk a
reasonable patient would consider to be material was something that the
trier of fact must decide, but it also found that Dr. Adducci owed Jane Long
a legal duty of informed consent.721 The court also held that expert testi-
mony was not necessary in this case because the type of harm in question,
the risk and the likelihood of that risk occurring, were factors that were not
in question. 722  Expert testimony is not necessary to establish what
significance a reasonable person would attach to the risk of death.7 23
The court then affirmed the summary judgment dismissal against
Mercy Medical Center. 724 To prevail on his claim, David Long would have
had to show that Mercy Medical Center owed Jane Long a duty to obtain
informed consent for the IVP.725 The court cited Kershaw v. Reichert726 as
holding that it is the surgeon, not the hospital, that has the knowledge
necessary to warn patients of the risk associated with a certain medical
procedure, and that the "hospital does not know the patient's medical
history nor the details of the particular surgery to be performed." 727 David
Long argued that the hospital accepted the duty to inform by having a
written policy for executing informed consents. 728 Since this was an issue
that had never specifically been addressed in North Dakota, the court
looked to what other jurisdictions have held.729 Ultimately, the court agreed
718. Id. J 16.
719. Id. 17 (citing Jaskoviak v. Gruver, 2002 ND 1, 5 18, 638 N.W.2d 1, 8).
720. Id. 18, 688 N.W.2d at 179.
721. Id. 21, 688 N.W.2d at 179-80.
722. Id. 23, 688 N.W.2d at 180.
723. Id. Expert testimony is generally used "to identify the risks of treatment, their gravity,
likelihood of occurrence, and reasonable alternatives." Id.
724. Id. 29, 688 N.W.2d at 181.
725. Id. 26.
726. 445 N.W.2d 16 (N.D. 1989).
727. Long, 26, 688 N.W.2d at 181 (quoting Kershaw v. Reichert, 445 N.W.2d 16, 18 (N.D.
1989)).
728. Id. T 27.
729. Id.
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with the majority of other jurisdictions and held that a written hospital
policy does not in and of itself create a legal duty upon the hospital to
obtain a patient's informed consent for a particular procedure.
730
TORTS-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS -NATURE AND GROUNDS OF
LIABILITY
FICEK V. MORKEN
The City of Fargo appealed a jury verdict awarding the Ficeks
$107,000 plus costs and disbursements in the Ficeks' action against the
Morkens and the City.731 The court rejected Fargo's plea to adopt the
public duty doctrine because it was incompatible with North Dakota law.732
The court concluded that "the district court did not err in instructing the jury
that the City had a duty to properly inspect the construction of the Ficeks'
residence and to enforce building codes." 733
In 1988, the Morkens started construction of an addition to their
home.734 The City of Fargo "issued the Morkens a building permit." 735
During the two-year construction period, the City's building inspectors
conducted more than forty inspections to ensure building code com-
pliance.736 In 1990, the City issued a certificate of occupancy to the
Morkens, certifying that the building met the applicable building codes.737
In 1996, the Ficeks purchased the house from the Morkens, and over
time, "noticed problems with the home's construction." 738  Experts
inspected the house and "determined [that the house] d[id] not comply with
the City's building code in several respects." 739 Subsequently, a structural
engineer advised the Ficeks that they needed to repair the foundation of the
house or vacate it.7
40
The Ficeks then brought this action against the Morkens and the City,
claiming that the City had "a duty to ensure that all buildings are
constructed according to relevant building codes and to properly inspect
buildings under construction to ensure the builder is following all relevant
730. Id. 5J 28-29.
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building codes." 74' The Ficeks claimed that the City "breached its duty by
negligently inspecting and approving the construction of the foundation of
the subject residence, as said foundation does not meet the required
building code." 742 At trial, the City requested an instruction based on the
public duty doctrine, but the district court did not give this instruction, and
instead gave a different instruction requested by the Ficeks.743 This instruc-
tion stated that the City of Fargo owed a duty to the Ficeks to properly
inspect the construction and to enforce the building codes.744
The only issue on appeal was whether the jury's instruction constituted
reversible error.745 The court stated that jury instructions must fairly advise
the jury of the law on the essential issues in the case.7 46 The City argued
that the public duty doctrine controlled, and therefore, it owed no duty to
the Ficeks.747 The court answered this claim, stating that it had never
adopted or even addressed the public duty doctrine.748
The court pointed out that even though a majority of jurisdictions
adhere to some form of the public duty doctrine, there is a trend towards
abolishing the rule.749 Thus, the court refused to adopt the public duty
doctrine. 750 The court reasoned that a state statute provided that political
subdivisions are liable for damages caused by an employee's negligence if
that employee would be personally liable for the damage. 75' Because of
this statute, the court concluded that "the public duty doctrine [was]
incompatible with North Dakota law." 752
Chief Justice VandeWalle concurred specially in the court's
decision.753 The Chief Justice agreed with the majority opinion because the
public duty doctrine was contrary to the wording of North Dakota Century
Code section 32-12.1-03.754 Specifically, the Chief Justice agreed with the
741. Id. 4.
742. Id.




747. Id. 10, 685 N.W.2d at 101.
748. Id. 11. The public duty doctrine provides that if a statute imposes a duty upon a pub-
lic entity to the public at large and not to a particular class of individuals, the duty is not enforce-
able in tort. Id.
749. Id. 5 20, 685 N.W.2d at 104 (citing Jean W. v. Commonwealth, 610 N.E.2d 305, 312
(Mass. 1993) (Liacos, C.J., concurring)).
750. Id. 28, 685 N.W.2d at 107.
751. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-03(1) (Supp. 2003)).
752. Id. 31, 685 N.W.2d at 108.
753. Id. 34 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring).
754. Id.
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understanding that certification of a building's compliance with codes is not
a guarantee that there are no defects in the building, or if there are defects, it
does not mean that the governmental entity issuing the certification is
automatically liable.7 55
TORTS- NEGLIGENCE-EXISTENCE OF DUTY-DUTY AS A QUESTION OF
FACT OR LAW
AZURE V. BELCOURT PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT
Agnes and Pete Azure appealed a summary judgment dismissal of their
negligence action against the Belcourt Public School District.756  The
Azures' action was based on injuries Agnes Azure received while working
at the Turtle Mountain Community School. 757 The North Dakota Supreme
Court affirmed the summary judgment ruling, holding that the Azures failed
to raise a genuine issue of material fact.758
Agnes was employed as a special education teacher at the Turtle
Mountain Community Middle School.759 At the time of her injury, she was
on duty as a lunchroom supervisor in the Middle School's cafeteria. 760
When a fight broke out between two students, Agnes intervened, but ended
up suffering a traumatic brain injury and was unable to return to work.761
The school building in which the lunchroom is located is owned by the
United States Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and is operated jointly by the
local school district and the BIA.762 Middle School teachers were
accountable to the Middle School principal regardless of whether the
teachers were BIA or School District employees. 763 Agnes sued the School
District, complaining that it negligently failed to maintain a safe environ-
ment at the Middle School and that she was injured as a result of that
negligence. 764 Pete sued for loss of consortium. 765
The court explained that to establish actionable negligence, "the
plaintiff must show the defendant had a duty to protect the plaintiff from
755. Id.
756. Azure v. Belcourt Pub. Sch. Dist., 2004 ND 128, 1, 681 N.W.2d 816, 817.
757. Id.
758. Id.








NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
injury." 76 6 The existence of a duty is a preliminary question to be decided
by the court. 767 If there is no duty, there is no negligence. 768 If reasonable
persons could reach only one conclusion, an issue of fact becomes an issue
of law for the court to decide, not the trier of fact.769
The court further stated that "the Azures... [needed to] first establish
that the school district had a duty to protect Agnes Azure." 770 Specifically,
the Azures had to show that the School District had a legal duty to provide a
safe environment for Agnes in the lunchroom.77' The court stated that
"[w]hether the relation between two parties is such that it gives rise to a
duty is a question of law for the court to decide."772
The court reasoned that to establish that the school district had a duty
to protect Agnes in the lunchroom, it was essential "to establish a
relationship through supervisory and operational controls." 773  If the
supervisory or operational control of the lunchroom could not be
established, there would be no relationship between the parties giving rise
to a duty, and therefore no liability for negligence.774 The court found that
there was "no evidence presented that establish[ed] that the School
District's control over Middle School operations included control over the
lunchroom, lunchroom supervision plan, or BIA employee Agnes
Azure." 775 The court concluded that the record was void of any facts
supporting an inference that the "School District had a responsibility to
provide, manage, or participate in the operational control of the lunchroom
or the lunchroom supervisory plan when Agnes Azure was injured." 776 The
court further concluded that "the Azures failed to raise a genuine issue of
material fact that would preclude summary judgment," and affirmed "the
district court's grant of summary judgment." 777
766. Id. 5 9,681 N.W.2d at 819.
767. Id.
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